Plea of guilty to lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

"Xxx.

Preliminarily, petitioners are challenging, on procedural standpoint, the manner in which the proceeding in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 entitled People v. Norman Maramara was conducted. They point out that after Maramara was arraigned in the morning of July 19, 1993, the trial court hastily heard and approved a plea bargain motion in the afternoon leading to his immediate conviction on the same day. They also fault the trial court in concluding that there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances to appreciate despite Maramara's confession to the murder of the victim. They likewise question why the filing of Criminal Case Nos. DU-3721 and DU-3938[15] was done separately and not simultaneously. According to petitioners, the conviction of Maramara in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 was precipitately done following a skewed procedure.

We disagree. We find no legal flaw in the assailed actions of the trial court in Criminal Case No. DU-3721.

At the outset, it is easily discemable that petitioners failed to point out any rule of procedure or provision of law that was transgressed by the trial court. On the contrary, the plea bargain was validly acted upon despite the fact that all the proceedings, i.e. arraignment, plea bargaining and conviction, occurred on a single day. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes plea bargain for a lesser offense in a criminal case, is explicit on how and when a plea bargain may be allowed. The rule pertinently provides:

Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

As clearly worded, there is nothing in the law which expressly or impliedly prohibits the trial court from allowing an accused to change his plea, on a plea bargain, immediately after a previous plea of not guilty. In approving the plea bargaining agreement, the trial court undoubtedly took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and its compliance with the requirements of the law.

Neither do we see any error in the trial court's holding that there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances to appreciate even with Maramara's confession of murder for the obvious reason that introduction of evidence became no longer necessary after entering a plea of guilty.

Respecting the non-simultaneous filing of Criminal Case Nos. DU-3721 and DU-3938, suffice it to say that at the time Maramara pleaded guilty, the present charge against petitioners was still in the initial stage of preliminary investigation.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319

As an exception, however, the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought

"Xxx.

The testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the conviction of the accused unless such testimony is supported by other evidence. As an exception, however, the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.[1]

Xxx.

Conspiracy was duly proven.

Like the courts below, we are equally convinced that there is sufficient evidence of conspiracy as convincing as the evidence of the participation of each of the petitioners. The records teem with circumstances correctly outlined by the trial court clearly indicating the collective and individual acts of the petitioners which reveal their common purpose to assault and liquidate the victim. For emphasis, we need to quote a portion of the ratiocination of the appellate court in this regard:

In the case at bench, as categorically attested to by witness Maramara. accused-appellants asked him to kill Pastor Papauran in exchange for money and dropping an earlier case, Criminal Case No. 24099, filed against him. They also accompanied him on the day of the shooting to see to it that the job was done. The concerted acts of accused-appellants reveal a consciously adopted plan and clearly demonstrate their joint design to exterminate Pastor Papauran. Conspiracy having been established, the act of one is the act of all.[22]

Needless to stress, these circumstances are clear enough to show that petitioners acted in concert in the implementation of a common objective - to kill the victim. In conspiracy, proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.[23] To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution nor talce part in every act and may not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.[24] But once conspiracy is shown, as in this case, the act of one is the act of all.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319

In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.

"Xxx.

The Petition for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages survived the death of petitioner

The criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner was elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena,7 to wit:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.8

If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or petitioner. In Sumaljag v. Literato,9 we held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to property and property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.

The CA erred in affirming RTC’s dismissal of the
Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages

When a party dies during the pendency of a case, Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily applies, viz:

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

The foregoing section is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court:

SEC. 17. Death of party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceased’s counsel to inform the court of such death, and to give the names and addresses of the deceased’s legal representatives. The deceased may be substituted by his heirs in the pending action. As explained in Bonilla:

x x x Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When [plaintiff], therefore, died[,] her claim or right to the parcels of land x x x was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.10

If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative fails to appear within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where the case is pending to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is to protect all concerned who may be affected by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and his estate.111avvphi1

In the instant case, petitioner (plaintiff) Memoracion Z. Cruz died on 30 October 1996. Her counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court of such death on 13 January 1997, through a Manifestation stating thus:

COMES NOW the undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully gives notice that the plaintiff, Memoracion Z. Cruz, died on October 30, 1996, in Manila as shown by a Certificate of Death, a certified true copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.

The legal representative of the deceased plaintiff is her son EDGARDO CRUZ whose address is at No. 3231-E Tabora St., Bo. Obrero, Tondo, Manila.

x x x x12

On 24 January 1997, respondent (defendant) Oswaldo Z. Cruz moved to dismiss the case alleging that it did not survive Memoracion’s death. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss in the assailed Order dated 2 June 1997.

We rule that it was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned earlier, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves property and property rights, and hence, survives the death of petitioner Memoracion. The RTC was informed, albeit belatedly,13 of the death of Memoracion, and was supplied with the name and address of her legal representative, Edgardo Cruz. What the RTC could have done was to require Edgardo Cruz to appear in court and substitute Memoracion as party to the pending case, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and established jurisprudence.

We note that on 17 October 1997, Edgardo Cruz filed with the RTC a Manifestation, stating that he is retaining the services of Atty. Roberto T. Neri. We quote:14

UNDERSIGNED HEIR of the late Memoracion Z. Cruz respectfully manifests that he is retaining the services of ATTY. ROBERTO T. NERI as counsel for the plaintiff.

(Sgd.) EDGARDO Z. CRUZ
Plaintiff

Consistent with our ruling in Heirs of Haberer v. Court of Appeals,15 we consider such Manifestation, signed by Memoracion’s heir, Edgardo Cruz, and retaining Atty. Neri’s services as counsel, a formal substitution of deceased Memoracion by her heir, Edgardo Cruz. It also needs mention that Oswaldo Cruz, although also an heir of Memoracion, should be excluded as a legal representative in the case for being an adverse party therein.16

Xxx."

MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. OSWALDO Z. CRUZ, Respondent. G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010.

The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3 [h] of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.

"Xxx.

Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.1avvphi1

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.lawphil.net

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.9

Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.10

Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.11

In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Court held therein:

However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature. His affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:

x x x x

(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit…. [Emphasis supplied].

The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.13

However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.

Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that:

Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:

"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited."

This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in "International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. (Emphasis supplied)1awphi1

Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s conviction and found that the same does not involve moral turpitude.

First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELEC’s finding that petitioner used his official capacity in connection with his interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the management to his wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him by the people.

The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioner’s conviction involved moral turpitude, misunderstood or misapplied our ruling in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According to the COMELEC:

In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted may per se not involve moral turpitude, still the totality of facts evinces [his] moral turpitude. The prohibition was intended to avoid any conflict of interest or any instance wherein the public official would favor his own interest at the expense of the public interest. The [petitioner] knew of the prohibition but he attempted to circumvent the same by holding out that the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is to be owned by a certain Daniel Teves. Later on, he would aver that he already divested himself of any interest of the cockpit in favor of his wife. But the Supreme Court saw through the ruse and declared that what he divested was only the management of the cockpit but not the ownership. And even if the ownership is transferred to his wife, the respondent would nevertheless have an interest thereon because it would still belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, of which the [petitioner] is the other half.

[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He has the duty to divest himself but he did not and instead employed means to hide his interests. He knew that it was prohibited he nevertheless concealed his interest thereon. The facts that he hid his interest denotes his malicious intent to favor self-interest at the expense of the public. Only a man with a malevolent, decadent, corrupt and selfish motive would cling on and conceal his interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly shows his moral depravity and proclivity to put primacy on his self interest over that of his fellowmen. Being a public official, his act is also a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the people. Clearly, the totality of his acts is contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, honesty and good morals. The crime, as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves moral turpitude.15

On the contrary, the Court’s ruling states:

The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-founded." This it based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.16

Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.

As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:

As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31 December 1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he transferred the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter applied for the renewal of the cockpit registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for renewal of the registration of the cockpit in question dated 28 January 1990 and 18 February 1991, she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the said cockpit. In her renewal application dated 6 January 1992, she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. Likewise in the separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 1992, which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992, respectively, in compliance with the requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the cockpit registration, she signed her name as Operator/Licensee.17 (Emphasis supplied)

Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the old LGC, mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions. Thus, in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that:

x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41 thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of the prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although ignorance thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.18 (Italics supplied)

The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum to a lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioner’s violation was not intentionally done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals but due to his lack of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition.

Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public morality as it tends to bring forth idlers and gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves moral turpitude.

Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation.19 While it is a form of gambling, the morality thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., it was held that:

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated May 11, 2007 and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for the position of Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that the crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents. G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009.

Administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal or criminal liability.

"Xxx.

Finally, Salvador argues that her conviction and eventual discharge from probation presents another administrative case to be filed against her because to do so would defeat the purpose of the Probation Law45 which was to erase the effect of conviction and to restore civil rights that were lost or suspended. Suffice it to state that probation does not erase the effects and fact of conviction, but merely suspends the penalty imposed. While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon, probation does not obliterate the crime for which the person under probation has been convicted. The reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannotjustify his retention in the government service.46 Furthermore, probation only affects the criminal liability of the accused, and not his administrative liabilities, if any. The Court once ruled in the case of Samalio vs. Court of Appeals47 that:

Finally, even if dismissal had been one of the accessory penalties of the principal penalty imposed upon petitioner in the criminal case, and even if the administrative case had been decided earlier than the criminal case, still the imposition of the penalty of dismissal could not have been suspended by the grant of probation.As petitioner himself contends, the criminal action is separate and distinct from the administrative case. And, if only for that reason, so is administrative liability separate and distinct from penal liability. Hence, probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case, not its administrative dimension.48 [Emphases supplied]

Xxx."

CECILIA PAGADUAN, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, Respondents. G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014.

Moral turpitude

"xxx.

Moral turpitude has been defined aseverything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; anact of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,30 contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.31 Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that the Court has to determine as to what crime involves moral turpitude.32 Salvador was convicted of falsification of public document. The MTCC found that she made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts and perverted the truth with a wrongful intent.33 While Salvador invoked good faith as a defense, the MTCC was not convinced, stating that good faith could not be made to depend solely on the self-serving statement of the accused. It must be supportedby other independent evidence.34 To the MTCC, Salvador miserably failed to clearly show the presence of good faith. More specifically, the trial court stated:

She alleged that she honestlybelieved she was employed with VWI because Alfonso Tuzon is the operations manager of VWI. Second, she was responsible in the preparation of the payroll sheets of VWI.

However, the following circumstances negate the existence of good faith:

1. Accused was not included in the list of employees of VWI as shown in Exhibits "G", "G-1", "G-2", "G-3", and "G-4," "J" and its sub-markings and "K" and its sub-markings;

2. Accused was not in the payroll of VWI as shown in Exhibit "L";

3. Accused received her salary from Rodolfo Quiambao and not from VWI;

4. Rodolfo Quiambao, who is not a VWI employee, issued directives to the accused;

5. Accused never went to the VWI office at Magapit, Lallo, Cagayan;

6. Accused never had any VWI identification card;

7. Accused had no contract of employment with VWI; and finally,

8. Rodolfo Quiambao worked personally with Alfonso Tuzon and not with VWI.

These circumstances were known to the accused. Despite knowledge of these facts, accused stated in her PDS that she was employed with VWI, thus, she perverted the truth. Said act constitutes malice on her part negating her claim of good faith.35 [Emphasis supplied] Granting arguendothat Salvador had no criminal intent to injure a third person, the same is immaterial as such intent is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.36

Salvador did not appeal from the said judgment and, instead, filed an application for probation which was granted.1âwphi1 It has been held that an application for probation is an admission of guilt.37 Logically then, when Salvador applied for probation, she admitted the making of an untruthful statement in her PDS. In Lumancas v. Intas,38 the Court held that "the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such employment."39 The filing of a PDS is required in connection with the promotion to a higher position and contenders for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position.40

As early as 1961, in the case of De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces,41 the Court disbarred a lawyer on the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, after having found that the said lawyer was convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents. Similarly, in In Re - Attorney Jose Avanceña,42 the said lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law due to a conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude after being convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents. Lastly, in RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin,43 the Court reiterated that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.44

Following the Court's disposition in the aforecited cases, the CSC and the CA therefore erred in reaching a conclusion to the contrary, especially that Salvador's conviction for such crime already attained finality. Both tribunals were of the view that Salvador merely committed a mere error of judgment and, thus, no moral turpitude was involved. Their position was based on the finding previously made by the CSC-RO II in the first administrative complaint. That could not a valid basis because, as earlier pointed out, the second case was separate and distinct from the first one.

Although the CSC itself recognized that it was for the Court to determine what crime involved moral turpitude, it ruled that Salvador's commission of the crime of falsification of public document did not involve moral turpitude. Both the CSC and the CA strayed away from the settled jurisprudence on the matter. It will beabsurd to insist that Salvador committed a mere error of judgment when the very basis of the second administrative charge against her was a final judgment of conviction where the trial court found otherwise.

Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public document is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, the elements of the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude clearly exist in this case. The Court does not have to look beyond what is simply apparent from the surrounding circumstances.

Xxx."

CECILIA PAGADUAN, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, Respondents. G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014.

The respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others.

"xxx.

The evidence of record supports the findings of the investigating judge.

It is a fact that the respondent was convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, at Quezon City. 7 While this fact alone is not sufficient to warrant disciplinary action, the respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others. His letter dated March 11, 1976 to Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City 8 contains defamatory and uncalled for language.

The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, presided by the complainant, Judge Remigio E. Zari, show that the respondent had exerted undue influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein. 9

It is true that conviction for libel does not automatically justify removal of a public officer. 10 However, the fact of conviction for libel of the respondent, taken together with the letter he wrote to then Executive City Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Judge Minerva C. Genovea, shows the tendency of the respondent to malign people.

Respondent's act of interfering in the cases pending before Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City presided by the complainant is inimical to the service. This alone warrants severe disciplinary measures.

In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the respondent stated "That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police record. " 

This averment is not true because the respondent had been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a sworn statement is another ground for serious disciplinary action.

The removal from the service of the respondent is warranted by the evidence adduced during the investigation conducted by Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City.

WHEREFORE, the respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is hereby DISMISSED as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any government instrumentality or agency including government owned or controlled corporations effective upon the finality of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal record.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."

HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, complainant, vs. DIOSDADO S. FLORES, respondent. A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356, November 21, 1979.

The petitioners' accusations on the charge of INDIRECT CONTEMPT fail to persuade.

"xxx.

Chairman Brillantes is not
liable for indirect contempt.

Finally, the Court does not agree with the petitioners' claim that former COMELEC Chairman Brillantes acted in a way that would make him liable for indirect contempt.

The petitioners allege that the respondents' refusal to abide by the Court's Resolution dated May 8, 2013 constitutes indirect contempt, as afore-outlined. Said Resolution stated, to wit:

After hearing the issues and arguments raised, the Court Resolved, in open court, to require the parties to SUBMIT simultaneously their respective MEMORANDA within twenty (20) days from date or until May 28, 2013.

The Chief Justice, in open court, DIRECTED the Chairperson of the COMELEC to include in his memorandum report of his COMPLIANCE with the undertakings he had made before this Court, including a report on how the COMELEC had proceeded to obtain and secure the source code of all the computerized voting machines used in the elections, how it was able to call the parties to make the same available for their review and how the review was conducted, as well as the discussions it had made with the parties.

Thereafter, with or without the parties' respective memoranda, the case shall be deemed SUBMITTED for resolution.66

Put simply, the order of the Court was for Chairman Brillantes to include in his memorandum the various undertakings he made in open court. Clearly, the only set undertakings promised by Chairman Brillantes were the following: first, to allow review after an interested party applies and complies with all the requirements for review under the resolution, as queried by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, and as confirmed during the oral arguments; second, categorically stating that he and the COMELEC would amend the resolutions to allow interested parties more time to comply with the documentary requirements, while mentioning that this would need to be implemented after the elections; and third, that the respondents would accommodate the petitioners' request to review the source code. All of which shall be reported in the memorandum.

The petitioners' accusations on the charge of indirect contempt fail to persuade. Under the law, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; and

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.67

The Court's review of the records reveals that the respondents did not renege on these undertakings. As to the first undertaking, while the Court questioned and ultimately found that the guidelines promulgated by the respondents went against the law in allowing the source code review, for purposes of the charge of indirect contempt, the Court finds that the respondents discharged their duty in making the same available for review. This is evidenced by the fact that other parties complied with the requirements and were able to review the source code, a fact that the petitioners do not contest.

As to the second undertaking, the respondents promulgated Resolution No. 9657, its purpose solely to grant interested parties time to comply with the documentary requirements, to wit:

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, [R.A.] No. 9369, and other election laws, the [COMELEC] has RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the request for the conduct of source code review, together with the credentials of the reviewer, shall not be filed not later than 01 April 2013, during regular office hours, at the Office of the Clerk of the Commission, [COMELEC], 8F Palacio del Gobernador Condominium, Intramuros, Manila, free from filing fee.68

As to the third, the Court agrees with the respondents that Chairman Brillantes' manifestations in open court, as well as its letter dated May 23, 2013, all sufficiently show that he made the effort to comply with the directive. It was the petitioners who failed to follow up on the respondents' initiative and invitation. While the petitioners indeed wrote a letter, this was done on the day itself of the review. It is not surprising, thus, that the respondents were unable to respond to the letter sent by the petitioners requesting for the immediate appraisal of the source code and the details appurtenant to the review. After all, the letter is dated May 9, 2013, the same day the review was scheduled, at 9:00 a.m., something the petitioners acknowledge. Both events occurred at around the same time on the same day, and it is impossible for the respondents to have replied to the same. It is ironic that the petitioners conveniently allege the lack of time to comply with the requirements of COMELEC, yet expect the respondents to reply the very same morning to a letter sent.

As for the SMS message allegedly sent by Senator Gordon asking for the time and venue of the source code review, there is nothing in the records that confirms the same. If the SMS message indeed existed, it was incumbent on the petitioners to produce it. This they failed to do, and as such, the Court cannot put any stock into this allegation.

In deciding that Chairman Brillantes is not liable for indirect contempt, the Court focuses solely on the undertakings that were directly promised to the Court, not those which the petitioner feels were promised. The Court does not subscribe to the arguments of the petitioners as articulated in their petition and reply, as to the propriety69 of the source code being reviewed only after four days which is allegedly a lack of time. Likewise, the petitioners' speculations that there was no subsequent source code review or even was a source code to review for both the 2010 and the 2013 elections,70 lose its sheen when one considers that other interested parties were able to review the code without a single complaint.

The Court reminds the petitioners that contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity.71 It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties-litigant or their witnesses during litigation.

In the case at bar, none of the above circumstances are present. This Court also notes that indirect contempt proceedings partake of the nature of a criminal prosecution; hence, strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions also apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.72 Moreover, in contempt proceedings, if the answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings end.73 The Court finds that the respondents were able to properly show their compliance with their undertakings, both in their contemporaneous and subsequent actions, as well as in their responsive pleadings to the charge of the petitioners. As a result, the Court is satisfied that the respondents did not commit any acts which would signify possible disobedience and disrespect to the Court, and thus, Chairman Brillantes is not liable for indirect contempt.

Xxxx."

BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SIMILARLY SITUATED, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 206719, April 10, 2019.

The petition has ceased to become a JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY and has become MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

"xxx.

Petitioners are not entitled to
the Writ of Mandamus to compel
COMELEC to once again open up
the source code review for the
upcoming elections immediately
for the review of the petitioners
and other similarly situated
parties, as the same has ceased to
become a justiciable controversy
and has become moot and
academic.

As the thrust of its Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, the petitioners firmly advance their narrative that the COMELEC failed to comply with Section 14 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 9369 The brunt of the petitioners' grievances lies in the alleged procrastination and negligence in both obtaining the source code, as well as the delay in making the same available for review to all concerned.41 This delay is attributed to the requirements for review as found in the assailed resolutions issued by the COMELEC, which go against the mandate of R.A. No. 8436 to "promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof."

By introducing requirements deemed as difficult to obtain and fulfill before the source code would be reviewable by an interested party, the petitioners advocate that the respondents, in effect, ensured that the source code could not promptly be made reviewable, which would then go against the express provisions of the pertinent statute. Thus, the petitioners pray for Mandamus that would direct the COMELEC to allow the source code review even if there is a lack of compliance or even complete non-compliance for the requirements for review as promulgated by the COMELEC.

To counter the petitioners' claim, the respondents put forth the defense that the strict nature of the guidelines is necessary in order to safeguard the process, and that the COMELEC has the power to regulate the conduct of the review through its guidelines.42

The respondents also posit the view that Resolution No. 9651, being the product of official acts, enjoys the presumption of regularity which all parties interested in reviewing the source codes must observe.43

As a matter of great importance, the Court takes judicial notice44 of the recent Resolution No. 10423 promulgated on September 21, 2018, or the Guidelines on the Conduct of the Local Source Code Review of the Automated Election Systems for the 13 May 2019 National and Local Elections by Interested Parties and Groups.

As a result of this new issuance, the dictates of procedural due process behoove the Court to dismiss the prayer for the Writ of Mandamus as to the source code. The Court holds that there has ceased to be a justiciable controversy.

A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.45 In relation to the foregoing, a case is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value, and as a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such a case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.46

The reasoning behind the dismissal of a case for being declared moot and academic is clear. Especially for pragmatic reasons, courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted.47 It is deemed unnecessary to indulge in an academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.48

In this case, the supervening event is found in the superseding of the assailed resolutions on the source code review with a new resolution, which pertains to the source code review for the upcoming 2019 elections. In Resolution 10423, it is observed that the COMELEC modified the qualifications for the local source code reviewer, to wit:

Sec. 5. Qualifications. The source code reviewer must be duly-authorized by the interested party or group and must be knowledgeable in computer programming languages and must be able to understand computer language preferably on the following programming languages and systems: C/C++, Java application development, Bash, Object Oriented Programming Language, Unix-like systems, and linux operating system.

The prescribed qualification is to ensure that the code reviewer can understand and appreciate the source codes of the AES to be reviewed. The interested parties and groups are expected to choose their reviewers based on this consideration.

Sec. 6. Number of Reviewers; Limitations. Each interested party or group may appoint primary and secondary code reviewers for each system. However, depending on the availability of space at any given time, each party or group may be limited to field only one (1) qualified reviewer at a given time.

The Court also observes that the application process contained in Resolution No. 10423 contains several steps before an interested party may actually get around to reviewing the source code. To wit:

IV. APPLICATION FOR THE LOCAL SOURCE CODE REVIEW

SEC. 7. Procedure. The interested party or group must submit a written request addressed to the Local Source Code Review Ad-hoc Committee signifying its intent to participate including its attachments. The written request must be signed by the duly-authorized representative of the party or group.

SEC. 8. Written Request; Contents. The written request shall contain the following details:

i. Name of the interested party or group;

ii. Intent to participate in the conduct of the local source code review;

iii. Name of the local source code reviewer/s and the latter's credentials;

iv. Signature of the duly-authorized representative of the interested party or group.

For this purpose, interested parties and groups shall completely fill-out Annex "A" of this resolution.

SEC. 9. Annexes to the written request. The written request shall attach the resume of the local source code reviewer specifically mentioning his or her experience in computer programming or related field. Said resume shall be under oath.

For IT Groups, a favorable recommendation from the CAC and/or the DICT shall also be attached.

For Civil Society Organizations, a brief summary of the electoral reforms initiated or supported shall also be attached.

In the event that the interested parties or groups cannot submit the complete requirements, a reasonable explanation must also be attached.

SEC. 10. Approval. All requests filed within the specified period shall be subject to the approval of the Local Source Code Review Ad-hoc Committee. The approval or denial shall be based on the following:

i. Request and its attachments;

ii. Presence of Qualifications;

iii. Date and time of the request received, if applicable; and

iv. Availability of slots/space in the source code review room.

The approval or denial of the request shall be sent to the e-mail address of the interested party or group used in the application.

The approval of the request shall also be posted in the official website of the Commission on Elections.

As this Resolution No. 10423 now governs the conduct of the upcoming elections, and any automated election from here on out unless it, itself, is superseded by another, the cause of action of the petitioners has ceased to exist.

Despite its aforementioned misgivings about the conduct of the COMELEC at the time the consolidated petition was filed, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to this important development in the case's factual milieu, the issuance of the new Resolution No. 10423. Thus, as to the source code review, with a mention that the COMELEC should be more circumspect when it comes to its rule-making power, the Court rules that the claims of the petitioners are moot and academic.

Xxx."

BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SIMILARLY SITUATED, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 206719, April 10, 2019.

Locus standi in Mandamus suits involving a public right

"xxx.

The petitioners have the
prerequisite locus standi to file the
Petition for Mandamus.

In their Memorandum,27 petitioners Bagumbayan and Senator Gordon state that they have locus standi to file the instant petition. They assert that Bagumbayan is a duly registered political party, while Senator Gordon was a candidate for Senator at the time of the filing, during the May 16, 2013 national and local elections.28

Furthermore, they posit that when a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, pursuant to Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,29 the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere feet that Senator Gordon is a citizen of the country.

On the other hand, while the respondents concede that Senator Gordon has legal standing due to his status as a Filipino voter, they allege that the same does not apply to Bagumbayan.30 The respondents posit that "even if Bagumbayan had legal standing to conduct a source code review, it failed to establish in its petition its capacity to conduct said review, as it did not submit the qualifications of its reviewer."31

The Court agrees with the petitioners. Locus standi, or legal standing, is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental ac that is being challenged.32 The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.33 This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that the Court settle only actual cases or controversies.34

In Mandamus cases, jurisprudence is clear that the requirement of proper standing is properly addressed if the petitioning party has a clear and unmistakable right to compel the performance of the ministerial duty.35 The Court finds that the requirement is satisfied by the petitioners. The petitioners have filed for Mandamus in their capacity as interested parties, Bagumbayan as a political party, and Tan Dem, et. al., as a people's organization created for the purpose of defending democracy in the Philippines. R.A. No. 9369 grants them the right as members of "any interested political party or group" to conduct their own review of the source code. Here, a clear and unmistakable right exists as it is the ministerial duty of the COMELEC to make available the source code for purposes of examination and test by any political party or candidate, or even their representatives, as expressly stated by the law itself, to wit:


SEC. 12. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 14. Examination and Testing of Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of the Source Code for Review. - The Commission shall allow the political parties and candidates or their representatives, citizens' arm or their representatives to examine and test. (Emphasis Ours)

The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the respondents that Bagumbayan lost that right when it failed to submit the qualifications of its reviewer, and which allegedly contravened the resolutions of the COMELEC. Section 12 of R.A. No. 9369 does not contain any provision or stipulation stating that the existence of the right to inspect may only come about after an interested party complies with any subsequent guidelines promulgated by the COMELEC. To rule otherwise would mean an unauthorized expanding or even the creation of unreasonable qualifications prerequisite to the review, which goes against both the spirit and letter of the law. Notably, pursuant to the Legaspi36 case, a cause of action exists on the simple basis that they are Filipino citizens and voters asserting a public right. The Court held therein:

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas... But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that:

* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws x x x.

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.37

It is important to note that a Petition for Mandamus has often been held to be proper if there are dire considerations of public welfare and for the advancement of public policy.38 It may also be taken into consideration to avoid future litigation39 and in furtherance of the broader interest of justice and equities.40 The law states that the COMELEC must allow political parties, candidates, and interested parties to examine and test the source code, regardless if those mentioned actually followed the subsequent guidelines as promulgated. Therefore, a cause of action to compel the COMELEC exists for Bagumbayan, as well as for any political party or candidate or their representative, as seen from the express mandate of the law. Thus, all the petitioners complied with the requirement of standing.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 206719, April 10, 2019

BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SIMILARLY SITUATED, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent

Intra-corporate controversy: relationship test and nature of the controversy test.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. MARCIANO S. BACALLA, JR., EDUARDO M. ABACAN, ERLINDA U. LIM, FELICITO A. MADAMBA, AND PEPITO M. DELGADO, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 223404, July 15, 2020.

Intra-corporate controversy: relationship test and nature of the controversy test.

“x x x.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)[2] assailing the July 27, 2015 Decision[3] and March 4, 2016 Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129574. The CA affirmed the Orders dated August 10, 2012[5] and January 14, 2013[6] rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 197 (RTC), in Civil Case No. LP-05-0212 which refused to apply the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (Interim Rules) and denied the Request for Admission applied for by the petitioner.

X x x.

The Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. No. 8799 applies to the proceedings in the RTC.

The Court notes that the petitioner does not challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in hearing the complaint filed by the respondents. The controversy lies in whether the trial court correctly applied the Interim Rules on Intra-Corporate Controversies in its proceedings below.

The Interim Rules traces its roots from Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 which transferred all cases under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate RTC. Under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, the following cases were transferred to the RTC:

a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission;

b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;

c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations. (emphasis supplied)


In compliance, the Court approved the Interim Rules on March 13, 2001 and took effect on April 1, 2001.[36] Section 1(a), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules restates the cases enumerated under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A with the addition of derivative suits[37] and inspection of corporate books.[38]

In the assailed Decision, the CA observed that based on the impleaded parties, allegations, and the reliefs prayed for, the complaint concerned the recovery of assets of the dissolved TGICI. It concluded that because of the fraudulent dissipation of TGICI assets caused by the officers, the matter had become an intra-corporate dispute under Sec. 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A.[39]

Indeed, the respondents initiated their action under the Interim Rules as shown on the face of the complaint which reads: "For: Devices or Schemes Amounting to Fraud and Misrepresentation Detrimental to the Interest of the Public Under PD No. 902-A and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. 8799 with Declaration of Nullity of Contracts and Specific Performance with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction."[40] But since courts cannot rely on the caption of the complaint alone, and if the complainant wishes to invoke the court's special commercial jurisdiction, the complaint must show on its face what the claimed fraudulent corporate acts[41] are which require the application of the Interim Rules. We expounded on this requirement in Guy v. Guy[42] as follows:

x x x. In Reyes, we pronounced that "in cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the court's special commercial jurisdiction." This is because fraud in intra-corporate controversies must be based on "devices and schemes employed by, or any act of, the board of directors, business associates, officers or partners, amounting to fraud or misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, or members of any corporation, partnership, or association," as stated under Rule 1, Section 1(a) (1) of the Interim Rules. The act of fraud or misrepresentation complained of becomes a criterion in determining whether the complaint on its face has merits, or within the jurisdiction of special commercial court, or merely a nuisance suit. (emphasis supplied)

We perused the subject complaint and were convinced that it contained specific allegations of corporate layering, improper matched orders and other manipulative devices or schemes resorted to by the corporate officers in defrauding the stockholders and investors of TGICI.[43] Evidently, these averments meet the standard of specificity required by Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A and Section 1(a)(1), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules.

However, the petitioner remained unconvinced that the Interim Rules applies. It argued that the complaint does not involve an intra-corporate controversy as it failed to satisfy the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test. It ventured that since Cielo Azul has a separate and distinct personality, there can be no relationship between the corporation and the respondents as TGICI receiver and investors.

The contention is erroneous.

In determining whether a case is an intracorporate controversy, We resort to a combined application of the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test.[44]

Under the relationship test, the existence of any of the following relations makes the conflict intra-corporate: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. For as long as any of these intra-corporate relationships exists between the parties, the controversy would be characterized as intra-corporate.[45]

Meanwhile, in the nature of controversy test, the controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.[46]

The subject complaint specifically alleged that the corporate officers resorted to corporate layering by transferring funds accumulated through investments by the public to TGICI subsidiaries. Such allegation plainly established the relationship between the petitioner as the issuer of shares funneled to Cielo Azul, and herein respondents as court-appointed receiver and investors. Based on this relationship, respondents sought the lower court to pierce the corporate veil and declare Cielo Azul, JAMCOR Holdings, TMG Holdings, Jesus Tibayan and Gelacio as having one personality. Accordingly, We concur with the CA that petitioner cannot take refuge from the defense of being a third party. The CA fittingly explained:

It is also undisputed that there is a right of action vested upon the Receiver of the said holding corporation as well as the investors thereof over the wholly owned subsidiary. The latter is sued in due regard to the allegations on the singular identity of the holding corporation and the wholly owned subsidiary in this case. This right of action by interested parties in the holding corporation over the subsidiary transcends the individual juridical personalities of the said corporations as ruled by the Supreme Court in Gokongwei vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, wherein the right of the stockholder of the parent corporation to inspect the books of the wholly owned subsidiary was upheld. x x x

x x x x

Accordingly, the fact that Prudential Bank (now Petitioner Bank) and the vendees who seem to be third parties do not necessarily convert this action into an ordinary civil action where only the Rules of Court applies. There are sufficient allegations of anomalies in the sale of all the corporate assets (the 630,225 shares of stocks) of the subsidiaries to the vendees with the latter's knowledge and participation and also with the knowledge of Prudential Bank. Thus, the impleading of the vendees and Prudential Bank aside from the subsidiaries and the officers of the corporation is only consequential because of Prudential Bank's and the vendees' participation in violating the investors' rights. What matters is that there is a violation of the Corporation Code and defraudation of those interested therein, i.e., the investing public.

In Spouses Abejo vs. Dela Cruz, the Supreme Court clarified that when it affects the interests of the corporation, i.e., the enforcement of rights and obligations under the Corporation Code affecting the internal or intracorporate affairs of the said Corporation, the same is an Intracorporate dispute. xxx

x x x x

Indeed, in Rivilla vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Court citing Abejo, recognized the dispute as Intracorporate as when schemes were resorted to by officers of corporations to defraud investors. x x x[47] (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

As a mere conduit in the alleged fraudulent investment scheme by TGICI, Tibayan and Elacio, Cielo Azul, with TMG Holdings and JAMCOR Holdings, cannot prevent the court-appointed receiver of TGICI from accessing its corporate books and records to recover the assets which have been purportedly dissipated through illegal stock trading. Verily, the nature of the dispute raised by the respondents in their complaint is intrinsically connected with the regulation of TGICI and its subsidiaries.

Considering that the present matter involves an intra-corporate dispute, the CA did not err in affirming the denial by the RTC of the petitioner's belated filing of Requests for Admissions based on Section 1, Rule 3[48] of the Interim Rules.

X x x.”

The rule against splitting the cause of action does not apply in a Petition for Certiorari

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. MARCIANO S. BACALLA, JR., EDUARDO M. ABACAN, ERLINDA U. LIM, FELICITO A. MADAMBA, AND PEPITO M. DELGADO, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 223404, July 15, 2020.


“x x x.

The rule against splitting the cause of action does not apply in a Petition for Certiorari


Petitioner maintains that the CA erred in applying the rule against splitting a cause of action. Accordingly, a Petition for Certiorari is not based on a cause of action but rather the presence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the assailed order.[49]

We agree with the petitioner.

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a "cause of action" as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essential elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.[50]

On the other hand, a Writ of Certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 will issue when there is grave abuse of discretion committed by a tribunal, board or officer who in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions, has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instance of grave abuse of discretion, the court may annul or modify the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and grant such incidental reliefs as the law and justice may require.

Verily, a Petition for Certiorari cannot be based on a cause of action. First, the parties involved in such petition would be the petitioner and the tribunal, board or officer who purportedly exceeded its discretion in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In a cause of action, the parties would be the plaintiff and the defendant who violated the right of the former which he (defendant) had the obligation to respect.

Second, a Petition for Certiorari cannot arise from a violation of a right belonging to the petitioner that the tribunal, board or officer has the concomitant obligation to respect. To reiterate, a certiorari writ will only lie when the tribunal, board of officer commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the existence of a cause of action will be the basis of every ordinary civil action.[51]

Third, a Writ of Certiorari results in the annulment or modification of the proceedings. However, the violation of a right of a plaintiff or breach of obligation by the defendant would give rise to a cause of action that will provide the plaintiff with the right to file an action in court for the recovery of damages or other relief.[52]

Finally, a Petition for Certiorari, being a special civil action, may only be availed of when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Meanwhile, a cause of action is the basic requirement in an ordinary civil action.

Here, the CA held that petitioner violated the subject rule and should have joined all its objections against the August 10, 2012 Order of the RTC in one Petition for Certiorari. The CA explained:

Petitioner is guilty of splitting its cause of action in the filing of the instant Petition. Rule 2, Sections 3 and 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provide:

Section 3. One Suit For A Single Cause of Action. — A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. (3 a)

Section 4. Splitting A Single Cause of Action; Effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (4a)

It is undisputable that CA-G.R. 127072 is a Petition assailing the contents of the 10 August 2012 Order of the trial court on the issue of whether the plaintiffs are non-suited. The instant action on the other hand, assails the same Order, albeit this time only on the portion resolving the issue of non-applicability of the ICC and the disallowance of the Requests for Admission. Definitely, the Petitioner could have joined all its objections to the assailed Order in a single Petition for Certiorari, but rather elected to file two (2) Petitions thus taxing the energy and the docket of this Court. Thus, the instant action should also be dismissed based on this ground.[53]

The CA arrived at an erroneous conclusion.

Petitioner filed the first petition (CA-G.R. 127072) to question the November 28, 2011 and August 10, 2012 Orders upon the belief that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to declare FITI and Bacalla as not suited. On the other hand, the second petition (CA-G.R. No. 129574) now subject of the instant case, arose from the August 10, 2012 and January 14, 2013 Orders of the trial court which petitioner maintains to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion due to the application of the Interim Rules. Clearly, the said petitions did not allege the RTC to have violated petitioner's right which may be the basis for a cause of action. Instead, petitioner alleged separate occasions of grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in not declaring FITI and Batalla as not suited and in applying the Interim Rules. Both petitions will give rise to an annulment or modification of the proceedings below and will not afford the petitioner with a remedy of damages against the RTC.

Moreover, a Writ of Certiorari may only be availed when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For this reason, We cannot fault the petitioner for filing the second petition because the trial court only ruled on the applicability of the Interim Rules in the August 10, 2012 Order. It is settled rule that a Motion for Reconsideration is mandatory before the filing of a Petition for Certiorari.[54] Hence, petitioner properly moved for a reconsideration of that portion in the August 10, 2012 Order pertaining to the application of the Interim Rules before directly resorting to a Petition for Certiorari. Accordingly, the CA erred in applying the rule against splitting the cause of action in the assailed rulings.

A final note.

The inaccurate application by the CA of the rule against splitting a cause of action will not negatively impact the efficacy of its July 27, 2015 Decision and March 4, 2016 Resolution. To recall, We affirmed the CA in denying the petitioner's application for a Writ of Certiorari because the Interim Rules apply in the proceedings below. The misapplication of the rule on splitting the cause of action was merely an innocuous mistake on the part of the CA and will not disaffirm our resolve to deny the present petition due to lack of merit.

X x x.”

Publication of laws

"xxx.

Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication

While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general, Tañada v. Tuvera states:

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169777_2006.html

Right to information on matters of public concern

"xxx.

Right to Information

E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:

It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.107 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 169777

April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169777_2006.html

Executive privilege

"xxx.

Executive privilege

The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress."64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."65

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims of varying kinds.67 Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations."

One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 68

Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:

Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the doctrine.

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’ domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.70 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.71

The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974. In issue in that case was the validity of President Nixon’s claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the President’s general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President’s claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.

Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.73 Despite frequent assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with President Washington’s refusal to turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue.74 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year as Nixon, recognized the President’s privilege over his conversations against a congressional subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon, the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. 76

In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.77 Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:

"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to information.78 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens’ demands for information.

In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters."80 The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information.

Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers,"82 by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information.

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.