Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr. - lcmlaw@gmail.com

Saturday, August 31, 2024

President and Senate vis-a-vis foreign relations

"The relationship between the two major presidential functions and the role of the Senate

Clearly, the power to defend the State and to act as its representative in the international sphere inheres in the person of the President. This power, however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever instrument the Chief Executive so desires. As previously mentioned, the Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international agreements the President enters into, as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution, obtain the approval of two-thirds of its members.

Previously, treaties under the 1973 Constitution required ratification by a majority of the Batasang Pambansa,^[19] except in instances wherein the President "may enter into international treaties or agreements as the national welfare and interest may require."^[20] This left a large margin of discretion that the President could use to bypass the Legislature altogether. This was a departure from the 1935 Constitution, which explicitly gave the President the power to enter into treaties only with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.^[21] The 1987 Constitution returned the Senate's power^[22] and, with it, the legislative's traditional role in foreign affairs.^[23]

The responsibility of the President when it comes to treaties and international agreements under the present Constitution is therefore shared with the Senate. This shared role, petitioners claim, is bypassed by EDCA."

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 212444]

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,

RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, C.J.:

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546

Foreign relations and policies

"The power and duty to conduct foreign relations.

The President also carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations.^[15] Since every state has the capacity to interact with and engage in relations with other sovereign states,^[16] it is but logical that every state must vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those other sovereign states.

The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness, x x x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.^[17]

The role of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that the Chief Executive must give paramount importance to the sovereignty of the nation, the integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-determination.^[18] In specific provisions, the President's power is also limited, or at least shared, as in Section 2 of Article II on the conduct of war; Sections 20 and 21 of Article VII on foreign loans, treaties, and international agreements; Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of Article VIII on the judicial review of executive acts; Sections 4 and 25 of Article XVIII on treaties and international agreements entered into prior to the Constitution and on the presence of foreign military troops, bases, or facilities."

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]

[G.R. No. 212444]

RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, C.J.:

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546

Monday, August 26, 2024

Preventive suspension

"Petitioner Yabut urges that his preventive suspension of 82 days should be credited to the penalty of 2-month suspension imposed on him. A preventive suspension decreed by the Ombudsman by virtue of his authority under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 6770, in relation to Section 9 of Administrative Order No. 07, is not meant to be a penalty but a means taken to insure the proper and impartial conduct of an investigation. We have ruled, in a number of times before, that a preventive suspension may be ordered even before the charges are heard, as well as before the official concerned is given an opportunity to prove his innocence, being merely a measure that is precisely designed in order not to hamper the normal course of an investigation through the use of influence and authority.8"

Case:

G.R. No. 111304 June 17, 1994

NEMESIO ARTURO S. YABUT and RICARDO M. TAMARGO, petitioners,

vs.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DR. PAUL DORAN, respondents.

Balane, Tamase, Alampay Law Office for petitioners.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and Nolaso for Dr. Paul Doran.

R E S O L U T I O N

VITUG, J.:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_111304_1994.html

Public officers and employees

"A public official, more especially an elected one, should not be onion skinned. Strict personal discipline is expected of an occupant of a public office because a public official is a property of the public. He is looked upon to set the example how public officials should correctly conduct themselves even in the face of extreme provocation. Always he is expected to act and serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable for his conduct to the people."

Case:

G.R. No. 111304, June 17, 1994

NEMESIO ARTURO S. YABUT and RICARDO M. TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DR. PAUL DORAN, respondents.

Balane, Tamase, Alampay Law Office for petitioners.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and Nolaso for Dr. Paul Doran.

R E S O L U T I O N
VITUG, J.:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_111304_1994.html

Tuesday, August 13, 2024

Cause of action: failure to state vs. lack of...

"The complaint stated a cause of action against respondent companies

To recall, there are two (2) sets of affirmative defenses raised below, viz.: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action, raised by PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty; and (2) lack of cause of action, raised by ProFriends.

In the Omnibus Order dated February 12, 2020, Judge Gill did not resolve the affirmative defense of lack of cause of action raised by ProFriends. She only resolved the common affirmative defense of PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. And yet, in the assailed Order dated May 22, 2020, the case against ProFriends was also dismissed on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, the common affirmative defense raised only by PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty.56

It has been repeatedly held, however, that failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct and separate grounds to dismiss a particular action. Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran57 explained that failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court or raised as an affirmative defense in an answer, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank58 further explained:

Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not interchangeable. It may be observed that lack of cause of action is not among the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The dismissal of a Complaint for lack of cause of action is based on Section 1 of Rule 33, which provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. - After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be made before a responsive pleading is filed; and the issue can be resolved only on the basis of the allegations in the initiatory pleading. On the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be filed after the plaintiff has rested its case.

In the first situation, the veracity of the allegations is immaterial; however, in the second situation, the judge must determine the veracity of the allegations based on the evidence presented.

x x x x

Hence, in order to resolve whether the Complaint lacked a cause of action, respondent must have presented evidence to dispute the presumption that the signatories validly and intentionally delivered the instrument.

x x x x

The test to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action against the defendants is this: admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, may a judge validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint?59 (Emphasis supplied)

Consequently, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint against ProFriends on ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, an affirmative defense it did not raise, and which is completely different from what it actually raised, i.e., lack of cause action. And strictly speaking, lack of cause of action may only be raised after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations or admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. Before then, it cannot be raised as a ground for dismissal; much less can the court dismiss the case on that ground.

We now go to the dismissal of the complaint against PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against them.

A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.60 A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.61

Here, the complaint for declaration of nullity of Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, Deeds of Sale, Cancellation of Titles, and Damages alleges:

1. Plaintiff Frank Colmenar x x x is the legitimate son of the late Francisco Jesus Colmenar (Deceased) and Dorothy Marie Crimmin (Dorothy).62

x x x x

28. Years later, Plaintiff learned of the unfortunate demise of his father.63 x x x

x x x x

29. Upon his death, Deceased left real properties registered under his name, to wit:

(1) An interest in a real property located in General Trias, Cavite, with an area of 130,743 square meters then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 579;

(2) One-half (1/2) interest in a real property located in General Trias, Cavite, with total area of 27,175 square meters then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 572;

(3) One-sixth (1/6) interest in a real property located in General Trias, Cavite with a total land area of 117,476 square meters then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25848; and

(4) An interest in a real property located in General Trias, Cavite with a total land area of 806 square meters then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 588.

30. Several years later, Plaintiff learned that Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria made it appear that they were the heirs of the Deceased in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 16 May 2008 involving a real property then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-579 registered in the name of the Deceased, and a portion of a real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-572 registered in the name of the Deceased and Angel Colmenar, both properties being located at General Trias, Province of Cavite.

31. Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria committed the same misrepresentations when they executed the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estates of Deceased Francisco Colmenar and Loida Colmenar dated 8 July 2011 involving a real property then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 579 issued in the name of the Deceased and another real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25848 in the name of the Deceased, among others, both properties being located at General Trias, Province of Cavite.

32. Using the foregoing deeds of extrajudicial settlement of estate as authority, Defendants Apollo and Jeannie executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 22 May 2013 in favor of Defendant PEC covering a real property then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 579 issued in the name of the Deceased. For her part, Defendant Victoria, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 22 May 2013 in favor of Defendant PEC covering a real property with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 579 issued in the name of the Deceased.

32.1. Subsequently, Defendant PEC sold the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 579 to Defendant Amaia, which by then was already covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 057-2013024578 in the name of Defendant PEC.

33. In the same manner, Defendants Apollo. Jeannie, and Victoria executed a Deed of Sale dated 12 September 2012 in favor of Defendant Crisanta, covering a real property then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 943212 issued in the name of the Deceased and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 January 2012 in favor of Defendant Profriends covering a portion of a real property then covered [by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25848 in the name of the Deceased, among others.

34. All the actions of Defendants Apollo, Jeannie and Victoria were made without the knowledge and consent of Plaintiff.ℒαwρhi৷ Worse, said Defendants did the same depriving Plaintiff of his successional rights under Philippine laws as the legitimate son of the Deceased.64

x x x x

47. However, Defendant PEC did not earlier acquire any right or interest over the property since the Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Defendants Apollo, Jeannie and Victoria are void.

47.1. The said deeds are void since Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria had no interest over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 579. Hence, they had no right to sell the same to Defendant PEC.

48. Despite not having acquired any right or interest over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 579, Defendant PEC still subsequently sold the said property to Defendant Amaia x x x65

x x x x

54. Subsequently, or on 21 September 2012, Defendants Apollo, Jeannie and Victoria executed a deed of sale involving the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 943212 in favor of Defendant Crisanta.

55. It bears stressing, however, that Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria are not [the] heirs of the Deceased. Therefore, they had no right to dispose of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 943212 in favor of Defendant Crisanta.66

x x x x

60. Defendants Apollo, Jeannie and Victoria subsequently sold Francisco Colmenar's share in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25848 to Defendant Profriends.

61. It bears stressing, however, that Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria are not [the] heirs of the Deceased. Therefore, they had no right to dispose of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25848 in favor of Defendant Profriends.67

x x x x

64. On account of the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and void Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 579, 943212, 25848 were cancelled.

65. To reiterate, however, Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria had no right to transfer the properties to Defendant corporations.

66. Consequently, the titles issued by Defendant Registry of Deeds under the name of Defendant Amaia, which originated from the title issued to Defendant PEC, should be cancelled. In the same manner, the titles issued by the Defendant Registry of Deeds to Defendants Crisanta and Profriends are earnestly requested to be cancelled.68

In essence, petitioner essentially avers that: (a) he is the legitimate son and lawful heir of Francisco Jesus Colmenar; (b) his father left real properties in the Philippines, the rights and interests of which would legally pass on to his heirs upon his death; (c) the individual respondents are not the lawful heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, thus, have no claim to the properties left by the latter; (d) the individual respondents, nonetheless, despite being devoid of any right in or authority over the estate of his father, were able to effect a void extrajudicial settlement of his father's estate, and thereafter, a void sale of his father's properties in favor of respondent companies, which, as a consequence, also did not acquire a valid title hereto.

In Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank69 the Court ordained that the test to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action against the defendants is - admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, may a judge validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint?

Here, assuming the foregoing allegations to be true, petitioner as legitimate child and lawful heir of Francisco Jesus Colmenar has the right to the relief prayed for. i.e., to declare as void the extrajudicial settlement of estate effected by the individual respondents who, not being lawful heirs of his father, had no legal right to settle the estate; and to declare as void the subsequent deeds of sale executed by these individual respondents in favor of respondent companies which consequently also did not derive any valid title from the individual respondents.

In Unciano v. Gorospe70 the Court underscored the fundamental principle that no one can give what he does not have. In other words, a seller may sell only what he or she owns, or that which he or she does not own but has authority to transfer, and a buyer can acquire only what the seller can legally transfer. As the Court emphasized in Daclag v. Macahilig,71 in a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is selling. Under Article 1458 of the New Civil Code, the principal obligation of a seller is to transfer the ownership of the property sold. Article 1459 of the same provides that the thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right to trar.sfcr the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. Nool v. Court of Appeals,72 further enunciated Article 1505 of the New Civil Code which provides that "where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell."

Hence, whether respondent companies were buyers in bad faith or had knowledge of the defect in the title of the seller is not the issue nor the trigger that gave rise to the complaint. Petitioner's causes of action hinged on his averment that the individual respondents are not the owners of the properties, hence, they cannot validly sell the same to respondent companies, nor convey any title to the latter by reason of the invalid sale. The spring cannot rise above its source. Needless to state, the trial court cannot inject its own theory to take the place of the actual allegations in the complaint. Besides, where petitioner in this case has no actual or personal knowledge of the good faith or bad faith of the buyers in the purchase of the properties, how could he possibly allege it in the complaint? In any event, good faith or lack of bad faith is a matter of defense for the buyers in this case. It can be pleaded in the answer and proved during the trial.

As enunciated in Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic,73 the presumption that a holder of a Torrens title is an innocent purchaser for value is disputable and may be overcome by contrary evidence, thus:

Sindophil insists that it bought the Trame property from Ty in good faith and that it was an innocent purchaser for value. However, the presumption of good faith and that a holder of a title is an innocent purchaser for value may be overcome by contrary evidence.

Here, the Republic presented evidence that TCT No. 10354, from which Sindophil's TCT No. 132440 was derived, was void. As found by the Regional Trial Court:

Record shows that Certificate of Title No. 6735, wherein the lot claimed by defendant, Marcelo R. Teodoro, lot 3270-B, is derived therefrom, is under the name of the Republic of the Philippines, dated October 17, 1913. Nothing in the subsequent annotations was under the name of any of the defendants and neither the subject TCT No. 10354.

With the Republic having put forward evidence that the Tramo property claimed by Sindophil belongs to the Republic, the burden of evidence shifted to Sindophil to prove that its title to it was valid. Concomitantly, it had the burden of proving that it was indeed a buyer in good faith and for value. As this Court said in Baltazar v. Court of Appeals, "the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that status" and "[i]n discharging that burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed to act in good faith. The good faith that is [essential here] is integral with the very status which must be proved." (Emphasis supplied)

In any event, the trial court's reliance on Spouses Castillo v. Heirs of Madrigal74 is utterly misplaced. It is not on all fours with the present case. Spouses Castillo involved a conveyance of property registered in the names of the Castillo Siblings. The conveyance appeared to have been executed by all the registered co-owners, albeit the plaintiffs later disclaimed their participation in the conveyance and sued for recovery of possession and ownership. Meantime the property had already been conveyed from the original buyer to a company who invoked the right of an innocent buyer for value. The Court ruled:

Where the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land alleges that some of the defendants bought said land from their co-defendants who had a defective title thereto but does not allege that the purchasers were purchasers in bad faith or with notice of the defect in the title of their vendors, there is a failure to state a cause of action. By reason of this failure, private respondent Susana Realty, Inc. is presumed to be an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith, entitled to protection under the law.75

Here, the allegations in the complaint do not speak of co-ownership between petitioner and the individual respondents insofar as the subject properties are concerned. There is no allegation either that the corresponding certificates of title which the respondent individuals transacted with respondent companies bore all the names of the respondent individuals, as well as the name of petitioner himself as their co-owner. Nor is there any allegation that the deeds of sale executed in favor of respondent companies were signed not only by individual respondents but also by petitioner himself, all of them being supposedly co-owners of the properties. On the contrary, the allegations in the complaint, assuming them to be true, are all about the unlawful conveyances of the properties by the respondent individuals who had no right to do so since the true and lawful owner of these properties is petitioner, no other.

All told, the trial court gravely erred when it held that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against respondent companies, and based thereon, dismissed the complaint against them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated May 22, 2020 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Trece Martires, Cavite in Civil Case No. TMCV-062-18 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint is REINSTATED as against Philippine Estates Corporation, Crisanta Realty Development Corporation, Amaia Land Corporation, and Property Company of Friends. The trial court is DIRECTED to PROCEED with the resolution of the case with UTMOST DISPATCH.

SO ORDERED."

[ G.R. No. 252467, June 21, 2021 ]

FRANK COLMENAR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN HEIR OF THE LATE FRANCISCO COLMENAR,* PETITIONER, VS. APOLLO A. COLMENAR, JEANNIE COLMENAR MENDOZA, VICTORIA JET COLMENAR, PHILIPPINE ESTATES CORPORATION, AMAIA LAND CORPORATION, CRISANTA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PROPERTY COMPANY OF FRIENDS, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE, RESPONDENTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/jun2021/gr_252467_2021.html

Retroactive application of procedural rules

"The trial court gravely erred when it applied the 2019 Amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by respondent companies.

The 2019 Amendments have been incorporated into the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, now known as the 2019 Rules on Civil Procedure. And as with all things new, precedence is generally scarce, hence, its application must be done with utmost caution and in strict adherence to its provisions.

Rule 144 of the 2019 Rules, provides:

The 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all cases filed after their effectivity on May 1, 2020, and also all pending proceedings, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern. (Emphasis supplied)

As worded, the 2019 Amendments shall also govern all pending cases commenced before they took effect on May 1, 2020, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case, the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern. Here, the case commenced with the filing of the complaint in September 2018 and remained pending when the 2019 Amendments took effect.

As it was, Judge Gill applied Section 12, Rule 8 of the 2019 Amendments when she supposedly resolved motu proprio the affirmative defense of respondent companies, that is, the complaint failed to state a cause of action, thus:

Section 12. Affirmative defenses. - (a) A defendant shall raise his or her affirmative defenses in his or her answer, which shall be limited to the reasons set forth under Section 5(b), Rule 6, and the following grounds:

1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;

2. That venue is improperly laid;

3. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;

4. That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; and

5. That a condition precedent or filing the claim has not been complied with.

(b) Failure to raise the affirmative defenses at the earliest opportunity shall constitute a waiver thereof.

(c) The court shall motu proprio resolve the above affirmative defenses within thirty (30) calendar days from the filing of the answer. (Emphasis supplied)

The records though readily show that when Judge Gill motu proprio resolved the affirmative defenses on May 22, 2020, the prescribed thirty (30) day period had long expired. ProFriends filed 1ts answer with affirmative defense51 in December 2018; PEC52 and Crisanta Realty53 on January 3, 2019; and Amaia54 on February 27, 2020. Judge Gill should have, therefore, desisted from applying the 2019 Amendments to the case below, specifically Section 12, Rule 8 thereof, because when she did, the same was no longer feasible.

Another. It was inaccurate for Judge Gill to say that she was motu proprio acting on the affirmative defenses. In truth, she had already resolved this common affirmative defense of failure to state a cause of action, together with the other affirmative defenses in her Omnibus Order dated February 12, 2020. There, she denied the motions to dismiss and motions to set the affirmative defenses for hearing because in her words, "the issues x x x are complex x x x and are x x x better threshed out in trial."55 Too, PEC, Crisanta Realty, and Amaia all had pending motions for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated February 12, 2020 when Judge Gill "motu proprio" resolved their common affirmative defense, and dismissed the case based on, and consequently considered the pending motions for reconsiderations as moot. Thus, instead of applying the 2019 Amendments, Judge Gill could have simply resolved the pending motions for reconsiderations of PEC, Crisanta Realty, and Amaia.

But this is not all. The worst part is when Judge Gill ignored the injustice caused by the application of the 2019 Amendments to the case. For as a consequence, petitioner lost his substantial right to be heard on the common affirmative defense of PEC, Crisanta Realty, and Amaia, and his right to seek a reconsideration of the order of dismissal which were both granted him under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure."

[ G.R. No. 252467, June 21, 2021 ]

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/jun2021/gr_252467_2021.html

Direct resort to the Supreme Court

"As for the second issue, whether the allegations in the complaint, assuming them to be true, state a cause of action against respondent companies is also one of law. The Court stressed in Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes,49 that where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. Indeed, in resolving whether the complaint here, based on its allegations, states a cause of action against respondent companies, the Court need not re-evaluate the credibility of any witnesses or the veracity of any evidence. The Court only needs to examine the complaint itself, the allegations of which are assumed to be true, in order to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action against respondent companies for declaration of nullity of deeds of extrajudicial settlement of estate, deeds of sale, cancellation of titles, and damages against respondent companies. To repeat, this is a pure question of law.

In fine, petitioner's direct resort to the Court is in accordance with Rule 45, which ordains:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.

As held in Daswani v. Banco de Oro,50 when only questions of law remain to be addressed, a direct recourse to the Court under this remedy is the proper mode of appeal."

[ G.R. No. 252467, June 21, 2021 ]

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/jun2021/gr_252467_2021.html

Question of Law

"A "question of law" exists when the doubt hinges on what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. If the question posed, however, requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual.47

Here, the first question of whether the trial court committed reversible error when it applied the 2019 Amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by the respondent companies, albeit the same was already pending when these Amendments took effect is one of law. In Central Realty and Development Corp. v. Solar Resources, Inc.,48 the Court held that the issue of whether the trial court correctly applied a specific law or rules to a particular case is a question of law, viz.:

Was the denial of petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings correct? Is Solar's action for specific performance barred by res judicata? Is summary judgment in the case proper? These are precisely the questions being raised here. The resolution of these questions rests solely on what the law or the rules provides on the given set of circumstances. In other words, the Court ought to look only into whether the trial court correctly applied the law or rules in the case. These are pure questions of law which do not require the examination of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)"

[ G.R. No. 252467, June 21, 2021 ]

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/jun2021/gr_252467_2021.html

Wednesday, July 31, 2024

May an accused indicted for Bigamy be exculpated on the basis of the judicial declaration of nullity of his first or second marriage?

"To summarize and for future guidance, the parties are not required to obtain a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a void ab initio first and subsequent marriages in order to raise it as a defense in a bigamy case. The same rule now applies to all marriages celebrated under the Civil Code and the Family Code. Article 40 of the Family Code did not amend Article 349 of the RPC, and thus, did not deny the accused the right to collaterally attack the validity of a void ab initio marriage in the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

However, if the first marriage is merely voidable, the accused cannot interpose an annulment decree as a defense in the criminal prosecution for bigamy since the voidable first marriage is considered valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted. The crime of bigamy, therefore, is consummated when the second marriage was celebrated during the subsistence of the voidable first marriage. The same rule applies if the second marriage is merely considered as voidable.

To our mind, it is time to abandon the earlier precedents and adopt a more liberal view that a void ab initio marriage can be used as a defense in bigamy even without a separate judicial declaration of absolute nullity. The accused may present testimonial or documentary evidence such as the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or subsequent void ab initio marriages in the criminal prosecution for bigamy. The said view is more in accord with the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, the purpose of and legislative intent behind Article 40 of the Family Code, and the rule on statutory construction of penal laws. Therefore, the absence of a "prior valid marriage" and the subsequent judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage, Pulido is hereby acquitted from the crime of Bigamy charged against him.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2015 Decision and August 18, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33008 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Luisito G. Pulido is ACQUITTED.

Let entry of judgment be issued."

G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021

LUISITO G. PULIDO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Link: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/jul2021/gr_220149_2021.html

Sunday, June 30, 2024

Denial and Alibi

"The defense of denial and alibi, as held by the Court of Appeals, is weak compared to the positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators.[49] Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[50] Where there is the least possibility of the presence of the accused at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.[51] In this matter, the Court has consistently ruled as follows:

The Court has considered the defense of denial and alibi put up by the accused, but finds them relatively weak and insufficient to overcome the positive and categorical identification of the accused as perpetrators. The rule is that the defense of denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and merits no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[52] (Citations omitted.)

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the defense of denial and alibi to be insufficient to overthrow the prosecution's evidence against the appellants, who failed to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when the incidents occurred."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

VS.

EDUARDO GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG, FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, AND TEDDY OGSILA Y TAHIL, ACCUSED, EDUARDO GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG AND FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

G.R. No. 205307, January 11, 2018.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63799

Right to Counsel in relation to Police Lineup

"The Court of Appeals emphasized that the prohibition against custodial investigation conducted without the assistance of counsel does not extend to a person in a police line up. This particular stage of an investigation where a person is asked to stand in a police line up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has been held that identification without the presence of counsel at a police line up does not preclude the admissibility of in-court identification. "

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

VS.

EDUARDO GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG, FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, AND TEDDY OGSILA Y TAHIL, ACCUSED, EDUARDO GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG AND FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

G.R. No. 205307, January 11, 2018.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63799

Proof of Conspiracy

"Anent the issue of conspiracy, the Court of Appeals stated that for collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proven by direct evidence or prior agreement to commit the crime nor is it essential that there be proof of previous agreement to commit a crime. Conspiracy may logically be inferred from acts and circumstances showing the existence of a common design to commit the offense charged. It is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Due to conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.[39] Furthermore, conspiracy exists when, at the time of the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their action.[40] "

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

VS.

EDUARDO GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG, FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, AND TEDDY OGSILA Y TAHIL, ACCUSED, EDUARDO GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG AND FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

G.R. No. 205307, January 11, 2018.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63799

Child Witness with Cerebral Palsy

"The Court of Appeals, at the outset, affirmed that the lone survivor, Cherry Mae Bantiway, is a competent witness although she is suffering from cerebral palsy, citing the rule that any child can be a competent witness if he/she can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his/her perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he/she is examined. The Court of Appeals held that even if Cherry Mae has cerebral palsy, she can still perceive and make known her perception, as per Dr. Hernandez's explanation in her testimony, which is quoted below:

You said that what you saw in Cherry Mae Bantiway was typical of...?

Cerebral palsy, Sir.

Will you please explain to us what kind of a sickness or diseases (sic) is this?

Cerebral palsy is a disease of the brain characterized by a non-progressive motor imperment (sic), non-progressive means to say it will not become worst and it is solely focused on the motor system movement, Sir.

x x x x

In other words, Dra. this (sic) patient's (sic) can still perceive and make known their perception?

Yes, Sir.

This is brain damage which involves the motor nerves?

The motor system, Sir.

And aside from the motor system the brain is functioning?

Yes, Sir.

In other words, the damage of the brain is not total?

Yes, Sir"

x x x x

"Q:

You said that you made this examination, did you find out whether she has the ability to recall the events that happen (sic) in the past?

Yes, Sir.

You know you've been told that this particular patient was the victim of violence, is that correct?

Yes, Sir.

And in accordance with your examination, did you find out whether she can recall some events which happened when injuries were inflicted on her?

I only asked her if she had a playmate and she said she has a playmate a young boy, and where is he now because I did not like to get it from her really like to lead her into a question but I asked her whether she had a playmate and she said yes and where was your playmate now, he's not there anymore and what happen (sic) to him she called her baby "ading" and where is he now she told me that he was hit on the head, Sir.

How did she tell you?

She told me "napakpak sa ulo" and she even gestured but that's all, I did not like to deal more or other things, Sir.

In other words Dra it was obvious at the time that she could recall some incident that happened?

Yes, Sir.

Now this patient Cherry Bantiway Dra in your opinion was she capable of concocting events or manipulating facts considering her mental condition?

No, Sir.[37]

The Court of Appeals found no compelling reason to overturn the RTC decision because there is no clear basis that the latter erred in finding that Cherry Mae is a competent witness. The Court of Appeals stressed that the trial judge is in the best position to determine the competence as well as the credibility of Cherry Mae as a witness since the trial judge has the unparalleled opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the record. On the allegation that Cherry Mae is mentally retarded as opined by Dr. Francisco Hernandez, the Court of Appeals held that this is insufficient reason to disqualify a witness, for a mental retardate who has the ability to make perceptions known to others can still be a competent witness.

Regarding appellants' allegations that Cherry Mae was not able to identify them in the initial stages of the investigation, the Court of Appeals stated that at the time of these initial confrontations at the hospital and at the police station, Cherry Mae had just survived from the incident where there were brutal killings and where she herself had sustained a fatal wound on her head. As such, the Court of Appeals noted that the condition of the child, being already afflicted with cerebral palsy, was aggravated by the head injuries inflicted on her, not to mention the state of shock and fear she might have been experiencing at that time. Thus, the Court of Appeals considered that the purported non-identification by child of the appellants at the initial stages of the investigation is of no moment and is not fatal to the prosecution's case.[38]

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that where there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him/her in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the witnesses for the prosecution had any motive to testify falsely against the appellants."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

VS.

EDUARDO GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG, FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, AND TEDDY OGSILA Y TAHIL, ACCUSED, EDUARDO GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG AND FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

G.R. No. 205307, January 11, 2018.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63799

Direct appeal to the Supreme Court in capital offenses

"Conformably with the decision promulgated on 7 July 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87, entitled The People of the Philippines vs. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution, and allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals before such cases are elevated to this Court, the Court Resolved to TRANSFER these cases to the Court of Appeals, for appropriate action and disposition.[35] "

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

VS.

EDUARDO GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG, FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, AND TEDDY OGSILA Y TAHIL, ACCUSED, EDUARDO GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG AND FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

G.R. No. 205307, January 11, 2018.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63799

Monday, June 10, 2024

Corruption in the Judiciary

#Corruption in the #Judiciary cannot be solved by perfunctory administrative/disciplinary #investigations alone. #AdministrativeCases are Reactive, not Proactive. The Judiciary should have its own Internal Rules to encourage #whistleblowers and to grant them #immunity as they reveal corruption-related information and documents that only #insiders know. Further, it is time for the Judiciary to establish its own Internal #Intelligence and #CounterIntelligence Divisions in the #JudiciaryIntegrityBoard and/or the #OfficeoftheCourtAdministrator. The said judicial offices must be #regionalized, too. The Office of Judicial Marshalls take care only of the security of judicial officers and personnel exposed to death threats. They're not into corruption-linked Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence missions in the Judiciary. Three serious issues weaken the Judiciary and the #RuleofLaw, whether here in the Philippines or abroad: (1) #Delay in the #AdministrationofJustice.

(2) #Graft and #Corruption.

(3) Lack of #Independence. The rest of the problems facing the Judiciary are secondary, like Computerization, Construction of New Halls of Justice, Compensation, Retirement, Continuing Judicial Education, Recruitment, and other Routine Administrative Issues.

Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr.

Sunday, May 26, 2024

Testimonial evidence, to be believed, must come not only from the mouth of a credible witness, but must also "be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience." A credible witness must, therefore, be able to narrate a convincing and logical story.

"Our Ruling

The Petition is bereft of merit.

The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.

Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court defines "burden of proof" as "the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.55 Once the plaintiff has established his case, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant, who, in turn, has the burden to establish his defense.56

In this case, respondent BPI, as plaintiff, had to prove that petitioner-spouses failed to pay their obligations under the Promissory Note. Petitioner-spouses, on the other hand, had to prove their defense that the obligation was extinguished by the loss of the mortgaged vehicle, which was insured.

However, as aptly pointed out by the MeTC, the mere loss of the mortgaged vehicle does not automatically relieve petitioner-spouses of their obligation57 as paragraph 7 of the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage provides that:

7. The said MORTGAGOR covenants and agrees to procure and maintain through the MORTGAGEE, a comprehensive insurance from a duly accredited and responsible insurance company approved by the MORTGAGEE, over the personalty hereinabove mortgaged to be insured against loss or damage by accident, theft, and fire for a period of one (1) year from date hereof and every year thereafter until the mortgage DEBTS are fully paid with an insurance company or companies acceptable to the MORTGAGEE in an amount not less than the outstanding balance of the mortgage DEBTS; that he/it will make all loss, if any, under such policy or policies payable to the MORTGAGEE forthwith. x x x

x x x x

MORTGAGOR shall immediately notify MORTGAGEE in case of loss, damage or accident suffered by herein personalty mortgaged and submit proof of such loss, damages or accident. Said loss damage or accident for any reason including fortuitous event shall not suspend, abate, or extinguish [petitioner spouses’] obligation under the promissory note or sums due under this contract x x x

In case of loss or damage, the MORTGAGOR hereby irrevocably appoints the MORTGAGEE as his/its attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to file, follow-up, prosecute, compromise or settle insurance claims; to sign, execute and deliver the corresponding papers, receipts and documents to the insurance company as may be necessary to prove the claim and to collect from the latter the insurance proceeds to the extent of its interest. Said proceeds shall be applied by the MORTGAGEE as payment of MORTGAGOR’s outstanding obligation under the Promissory Note and such other sums and charges as may be due hereunder or in other instruments of indebtedness due and owing by the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE and the excess, if any, shall thereafter be remitted to the MORTGAGOR. MORTGAGEE however shall be liable in the event there is a deficiency.

x x x x58

Based on the foregoing, the mortgagor must notify and submit proof of loss to the mortgagee.1âwphi1 Otherwise, the mortgagee would not be able to claim the proceeds of the insurance and apply the same to the remaining obligation.

This brings us to the question of whether petitioner-spouses sent notice and proof of loss to Citytrust or respondent BPI.

Testimonial evidence must also be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience.

Testimonial evidence, to be believed, must come not only from the mouth of a credible witness, but must also "be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience."59 A credible witness must, therefore, be able to narrate a convincing and logical story.

In this case, petitioner Manolito's testimony that he sent notice and proof of loss of the mortgaged vehicle to Citytrust through fax lacks credibility especially since he failed to present the facsimile report evidencing the transmittal.60 His failure to keep the facsimile report or to ask for a written acknowledgement from Citytrust of its receipt of the transmittal gives us reason to doubt the truthfulness of his testimony. His testimony on the alleged theft is likewise suspect. To begin with, no police report was presented.61 Also, the insurance policy was renewed even after the mortgaged vehicle was allegedly stolen.62 And despite repeated demands from respondent BPI, petitioner-spouses made no effort to communicate with the bank in order to clarify the matter. The absence of any overt act on the part of petitioner-spouses to protect their interest from the time the mortgaged vehicle was stolen up to the time they received the summons defies reason and logic. Their inaction is obviously contrary to human experience. In addition, we cannot help but notice that although the mortgaged vehicle was stolen in November 1997, petitioner-spouses defaulted on their monthly amortizations as early as August 10, 1997. All these taken together cast doubt on the truth and credibility of his testimony.

Thus, we are in full accord with the findings of the MeTC and the CA that petitioner Manolito's testimony lacks credence as it is dubious and self-serving.63 Failing to prove their defense, petitioner-spouses are liable to pay their remaining obligation.

WHEREFORE the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed November 16, 2007 Decision and the September 19, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91217 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 184565 November 20, 2013

MANOLITO DE LEON and LOURDES E. DE LEON, Petitioners,

vs.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_184565_2013.html

Recoveyance and recovery of possession based on constructive trust and fraud vs. the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title

"The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

The Court is not unmindful of the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title and Section 48 of P.D. No. 1528 where it is provided that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.14 A Torrens title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. When the Court says direct attack, it means that the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.15 In its decision, the MCTC wrote:

Obviously, the bone of contention in this case are the deed of sale by and between Romulo Marquez and Runsted Tagufa, the estranged husband of defendant Gregoria Tagufa, and OCT No. P-84609 registered in the name of Gregoria Tagufa who, according to the plaintiff, fraudulently caused the titling of the same.

In their lamentations, plaintiff pointed out the following indicia of fraud committed by GregoriaTagufa that would allegedly justify reconveyance:

First, Gregoria Tagufa made it appear in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of spouses Leandro Tagufa and Remedios Talosig that she is an heir when, in truth, she is only a grand daughter-in-law,

Second, she already knew when she applied for free patent that plaintiff was already the owner of the land she was applying for;

Third, she already knew that when she applied for free patent that plaintiff’s parents were not anymore the owners of the land as the same was mortgaged with the DBP; and

Fourth, defendant has never been in actual possession of the property when she applied for it.

All in all, plaintiff argued, Gregoria Tagufa never acquired any valid right or legal title over the property.

Studying the merits of this case and removing all its superfluities, plaintiffs plainly question the title generated in the name of defendant Gregoria Tagufa having been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. However, in the judicious analysis by this court, plaintiffs have resorted to a wrong cause of action.16

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the MCTC was convinced that fraud was attendant in the registration of the land but was not convinced that reconveyance was an accepted remedy. Contrary to the pronouncements of the MCTC and the CA, however, the complaint of Hortizuela was not a collateral attack on the title warranting dismissal. As a matter of fact, an action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in personam, available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name. In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not sought to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside the decree but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value.17 There is no quibble that a certificate of title, like in the case at bench, can only be questioned through a direct proceeding. The MCTC and the CA, however, failed to take into account that in a complaint for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible and is not being questioned. What is being sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right. If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property.18

The fact that Gregoria was able to secure a title in her name does not operate to vest ownership upon her of the subject land. "Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner."19

Furthermore, respondents’ argument that the overriding reason why Hortizuela chose to file a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession was that she failed to avail of the remedy provided under Section 38 of Act 496 within the prescribed period of one (1) year, counted from the issuance of the patent by the government, is weak. As was similarly held in Cervantes v. CA,20 with the land obtained by respondent Gregoria through fraudulent machinations by means of which a free patent and a title were issued in her name, she was deemed to have held it in trust for the benefit of Hortizuela who was prejudiced by her actions. Article 1456 provides: ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

The remedy of reconveyance, based on Section 53 of P.D. No. 1529 and Article 1456, prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

The Court is not unaware of the rule that a fraudulently acquired free patent may only be assailed by the government in an action for reversion pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act.21 In Sherwill Development Corporation v. Sitio Sto. Niño Residents Association, Inc.,22 this Court pointed out that:

x x x It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its duly-authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.23

An action for reconveyance is proper

The foregoing rule is, however, not without exception. A recognized exception is that situation where plaintiff-claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant of publicland unlawfully and in breach of trust titled by him, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive trust. This was the ruling in Larzano v. Tabayag, Jr.,24 where it was written:

A private individual may bring an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title thereof was issued through a free patent since such action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.

In Roco, et al. v. Gimeda, we stated that if a patent had already been issued through fraud or mistake and has been registered, the remedy of a party who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance, thus:

It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a reconsideration of the granting of the patent or of the decree issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is not to annul the title but to have it conveyed to plaintiffs. Fraudulent statements were made in the application for the patent and no notice thereof was given to plaintiffs, nor knowledge of the petition known to the actual possessors and occupants of the property. The action is one based on fraud and under the law, it can be instituted within four years from the discovery of the fraud. (Art. 1146, Civil Code, as based on Section 3, paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.) It is to be noted that as the patent here has already been issued, the land has the character of registered property in accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2332, and the remedy of the party who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance. (Director of Lands vs. Registered of Deeds, 92 Phil., 826; 49 Off. Gaz. [3] 935; Section 55 of Act No. 496.)

In the same vein, in Quiñiano, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., we stressed that:

The controlling legal norm was set forth in succinct language by Justice Tuason in a 1953 decision, Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal. Thus: "The sole remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, as was done in the instant case, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages." Such a doctrine goes back to the 1919 landmark decision of Cabanos v. Register of Deeds of Laguna. If it were otherwise the institution of registration would, to quote from Justice Torres, serve "as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith ...." In the language of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon: "A different view would encourage fraud and permit one person unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another." It would indeed be a signal failing of any legal system if under the circumstances disclosed, the aggrieved party is considered as having lost his right to a property to which he is entitled. It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter, and one devoid of justification, if [deceit] would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed. As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against. So it has been before; so it should continue to be. (Citations omitted)

In this case, in filing the complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession, Hortizuela was not seeking a reconsideration of the granting of the patent or the decree issued in the registration proceedings. What she was seeking was the reconveyance of the subject property on account of the fraud committed by respondent Gregoria. An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.25 Thus, the RTC did not err in upholding the right of Hortizuela to ask for the reconveyance of the subject property. To hold otherwise would be to make the Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud. To reiterate,

The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did not operate to vest ownership upon her of the subject land.1âwphi1 Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.26

Finally, respondents' supposition that Hortizuela was ineligible to own the subject property pursuant to B.P. Blg. 223 because she was no longer a Filipino citizen cannot be considered for having been raised only for the first time on appeal. It must be noted that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.27 The reason therefor is due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 13, 2012 Decision and the January 25, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122648 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 1, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, is hereby RE INST A TED.

SO ORDERED."

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 205867 February 23, 2015

MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA, represented by JOVIER TAGUFA, Petitioner,

vs.

GREGORIA TAGUFA, ROBERTO TAGUFA and ROGELIO LUMABAN, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/feb2015/gr_205867_2015.html

Friday, May 24, 2024

Definition, Purpose, and Concept of an Action for Declaratory Relief

"Ruling of the Court

We grant the Petition.

Definition, Purpose, and Concept of an Action for Declaratory Relief

Declaratory relief is a special civil action filed by any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation, before breach or violation thereof, to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights thereunder.15

The purpose of the action for declaratory relief is for the court to interpret or determine the validity of the written instrument, statute, executive order, or any other governmental regulation and to secure from the court an authoritative statement of the parties' rights and obligations thereunder for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance,16 but not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach.17 The issue is thus limited to the question of construction or validity of the provisions in a written instrument or statute.18 In a declaratory relief action, "the [r]elief is confined to a case of actual controversy within the Court's jurisdiction, without the need of injunction, execution, or other relief beyond the adjudication of the legal rights which are the subject of controversy between the parties."19

In Aquino v. Municipality of Malay,20 the Court explained the concept of declaratory relief, viz.:

An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.21 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, a court can no longer assume jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., statute, deed, or contract, has already been contravened prior to the filing of the action.22 Where the statute, deed, or contract has already been breached or violated, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to file the appropriate ordinary civil action in court.23 In Tambunting, Jr. v. Spouses Sumabat,24 the Court stressed that an action for declaratory relief, filed after an infraction of the mortgage terms, did not interrupt the running of the ten-year prescriptive period to enforce petitioners' right under the mortgage since the lower court lacked jurisdiction over such action and all proceedings therein were without legal effect.

Requisites for an Action for Declaratory Relief

The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.25

Actual Case or Controversy Requirement

A petition for declaratory relief is not exempt from the actual case or controversy requirement. Jurisprudence reveals a common ground in applying the actual case or controversy requirement – there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues, such that the questions raised may be resolved without relying on speculations or hypothetical scenarios.

The determination of sufficient facts is more nuanced in petitions for declaratory relief. Applying the third and fourth requisites for a declaratory relief action, We must locate the fine point where there exists an actual case or controversy, yet there is no breach of the documents in question. On this note, former Chief Justice Moran opined that accomplished physical wrong need not be alleged in a petition for declaratory relief.26

This is best explained in the case of Republic v. Roque,27 where a petition for declaratory relief was filed by private respondents to assail the constitutionality of RA 9372, or the Human Security Act of 2007. We explained that a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. The term 'ripening seeds' means "not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full-blown battle that looms ahead." The concept describes "a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration."28

Following the disquisition in Roque, in a petition for declaratory relief, there are "sufficient facts" when there is a showing of an imminent and inevitable litigation if the issue is not judicially settled. The same rule was declared in CJH Development v. BIR29 where We ruled that ripeness in declaratory relief cases means that litigation is inevitable or there is no adequate relief available in any other form or proceeding.30 To require more than this standard will already negate the requirement that declaratory relief cases should be filed before any breach.

Admittedly, the standard of imminent and inevitable litigation in declaratory relief petitions is easier to overcome than the general standard on ripeness that petitioner must have suffered injury or been held liable under an assailed governmental act. However, this should not be construed to mean that declaratory relief cases are exceptions to the restrictive application of judicial restraint. It must be remembered that the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction over declaratory relief cases. Moreover, the last requisite of declaratory relief is that there must be a showing that adequate relief is not available through other means. Section 5, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court also states that "the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances." All of these suggest a restrictive interpretation in taking cognizance of declaratory relief cases.

Thus, in the recent cases of Universal Robina Corporation v. Department of Trade and Industry31 and Executive Secretary v. Pilipinas Shell,32 We emphasized that the standard rules of justiciability apply in a petition for declaratory relief, which assails the constitutionality of a statute. The petitioner in a declaratory petition must establish that there is a legally demandable and enforceable right under the Constitution and that the resolution of the statute's constitutionality is necessary to protect such right.33 Nevertheless, We clarified that the exercise of judicial review may not always require actual facts resulting from the assailed law, as applied, since a clear and convincing demonstration of a contrariety of rights may suffice.34

An Action for Declaratory Relief is proper in this case

At the outset, the Court finds that all the elements of declaratory relief are present in this case. Section l, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for declaratory relief may be filed before the RTC by any person whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation, before breach or violation thereof, to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the terms of the assailed statutes, especially in relation to the pertinent IRR, have created doubts on the proper application of the 20% discount on funeral and burial services. Respondent, a corporation engaged in selling memorial lots and providing interment services, is directly affected by the assailed statutes and the IRR. Xxxx."

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 243133. March 08, 2023 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE SENIOR CITIZENS AFFAIRS (OSCA), DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), PETITIONERS, VS. PRYCE CORPORATION, INC., RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/mar2023/gr_243133_2023.html

Tuesday, April 30, 2024

Technicality vs. Merits of the Case. Doctrine of Liberality in Litigation.

"Under the circumstances, the failure to file the appellant’s brief on time rightly deserved the outright rejection of the appeal. The acts of his counsel bound Diaz like any other client. It was, of course, only the counsel who was well aware that the Rules of Court fixed the periods to file pleadings and equally significant papers like the appellant’s brief with the lofty objective of avoiding delays in the administration of justice.

Yet, we have before us an appeal in two criminal cases in which the appellant lost his chance to be heard by the CA on appeal because of the failure of his counsel to serve and file the appellant’s brief on time despite the grant of several extensions the counsel requested. Diaz was convicted and sentenced to suffer two indeterminate sentences that would require him to spend time in detention for each conviction lasting two years, as minimum, to five years, as maximum, and to pay fines totaling ₱100,000.00 (with subsidiary imprisonment in case of his insolvency). His personal liberty is now no less at stake. This reality impels us to look beyond the technicality and delve into the merits of the case to see for ourselves if the appeal, had it not been dismissed, would have been worth the time of the CA to pass upon. After all, his appellant’s brief had been meanwhile submitted to the CA. While delving into the merits of the case, we have uncovered a weakness in the evidence of guilt that cannot be simply ignored and glossed over if we were to be true to our oaths to do justice to everyone.

We feel that despite the CA being probably right in dismissing the excuses of oversight and excusable negligence tendered by Diaz’s counsel to justify the belated filing of the appellant’s brief as unworthy of serious consideration, Diaz should not be made to suffer the dire consequence. Any accused in his shoes, with his personal liberty as well as his personal fortune at stake, expectedly but innocently put his fullest trust in his counsel’s abilities and professionalism in the handling of his appeal. He thereby delivered his fate to the hands of his counsel. Whether or not those hands were efficient or trained enough for the job of handling the appeal was a learning that he would get only in the end. Likelier than not, he was probably even unaware of the three times that his counsel had requested the CA for extensions. If he were now to be left to his unwanted fate, he would surely suffer despite his innocence. How costly a learning it would be for him! That is where the Court comes in. It is most important for us as dispensers of justice not to allow the inadvertence or incompetence of any counsel to result in the outright deprivation of an appellant’s right to life, liberty or property.13

We do not mind if this softening of judicial attitudes be mislabeled as excessive leniency. With so much on the line, the people whose futures hang in a balance should not be left to suffer from the incompetence, mindlessness or lack of professionalism of any member of the Law Profession. They reasonably expect a just result in every litigation. The courts must give them that just result. That assurance is the people’s birthright. Thus, we have to undo Diaz’s dire fate."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO RELLON alias "GENIO", accused-appellant. G.R. No. 74051, November 8, 1988.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

EUGENIO RELLON alias "GENIO", accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 74051, November 8, 1988.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/nov1988/gr_74051_1988.html

GENERAL SEARCH WARRANTS

G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020 MERLINA R. DIAZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

"We deny the Petition.

The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution27 and in Rule 126, Section 428 of the Rules Court, viz.: "(1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized."29 The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrant.30

There is no question that the search warrant was issued after judicial determination of probable cause. This Court is thus confined in determining the presence or absence of the fifth requisite element as stated above, i.e., whether the subject warrant specifically described the place to be searched.

"A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution."31 The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion to decide on their own where to search and whom and what to seize.32 "Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the [court] that the described items are to be found in a particular place."33

Notably, it is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. Hence, "[a] designation that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness."34

Simply put, the test of whether the requirement of definiteness or particularity has been met is whether the description of the place to be searched under the warrant is sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent a search of other premises located within the surrounding area or community. A "place" may refer to a single building or structure, or a house or residence,35 such as in the case at bar.

Thus, it has been held that a designation of a place to be searched as "MASAGANA compound located at Governor's Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City ";36 "the house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City ";37 or "premises of Felix Gumpal Compound located at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela"38 is sufficient description of the premises to be searched.

The search warrant in the instant case clearly complied with the foregoing standard since it particularly described the place to be searched, which is petitioner's "house at Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna." The subject search warrant sufficiently described the place to be searched with clear indication that the same was intended to authorize a search of the entire house of petitioner, albeit confined to the area of her house, to the exclusion of the other two structures or buildings similarly located along the street of Gitna. Simply put, the constitutional requirement of definiteness has been met. We therefore agree with the CA when it held, viz.:

In this case, although the house number of petitioner's house was not indicated in Search Warrant No. 97 (12), the description of the place to be searched was sufficient as the police officers who served the same were able, with reasonable effort, to ascertain and identify the house of petitioner at Gitna, Barangay Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna, as stated in the search warrant. It bears emphasis that informant Jericho Labrador, when asked by Executive Judge Morga, also drew sketches where petitioner's house was located as well [as] the floor plan of her house, which were used by the searching team.39

This notwithstanding, petitioner argued that the warrant was issued on a mistaken belief that the house was a single dwelling unit occupied by petitioner alone. Petitioner thus insisted that the inaccurate depiction of the house's floor plan, and the consequent search of the entire premises of a supposed multiple-occupancy structure, invalidated the warrant.

In this regard, the records would confirm that the house described in the warrant was composed of and divided into five separate units or rooms each occupied by petitioner, and her four siblings and their families. Petitioner explained that although the units or rooms were contiguous to each other, each unit was a complete household independent of the other and may be entered only through their respective front doors. Considering the foregoing, petitioner stressed that the central issue in the instant case is not whether the police officers who enforced the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched, but rather, whether the description of the place to be searched set out in the warrant was sufficient which would prevent the officers from exercising discretion.

From the foregoing, it would appear that the issue on the requirement of definiteness raised by petitioner is two-tiered – that of the place to be searched, i.e., her home at No. 972, Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna, and the interior description thereof. Petitioner persists on the lack of sufficient definiteness of the latter.

While petitioner did not deny that the place actually searched by the police officers is her home in Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna, she argued, however, that it was incumbent upon PO2 Avila and Labrador to infonn Judge Morga of an accurate description or floor plan of the house so as to confine the scope of the search within the unit where petitioner actually resided. Considering PO2 Avila's and Labrador's failure to provide Judge Morga a full and accurate description of the house described in the warrant, i.e., that the same was partitioned into five separate units, and that there were other families living in the other units of the house, Judge Morga was led to believe that the area to be searched comprised of the whole house.

Petitioner thus argued that the coverage of the warrant was broader than appropriate considering that the search covered the whole house and was not limited to the unit actually occupied by petitioner. To petitioner's mind, this gave the police officers undue discretion in enforcing the warrant, which they allegedly did when they searched the units occupied by petitioner's siblings, namely, Leomer and Leonora.

In support of her argument, petitioner cited People v. Estrada40 (Estrada) and Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines v. Asuncion41 (Asuncion). In Estrada,42 this Court invalidated the search warrant because it merely indicated the address of the compound where the place to be searched was located, without, however, pinpointing the specific house to be searched from the other buildings or structures which were also situated within the same compound. Along the same lines, this Court, in Asuncion,43 characterized the search warrant as a general warrant since it authorized a search of a compound, which, however, was made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structure, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares."

Petitioner's reliance on the said cases, however, was misplaced as the factual milieus therein are not in all fours with the case at bench. The ruling in these cases were, on one hand, premised on the fact that the subject warrants gave the police officers unbridled discretion to search several, if not all, structures found inside the compounds – enclosed areas of land containing clusters of structures and/or buildings – while probable cause existed in only one of the several structures located in the compounds. Clearly, the warrants in these cases gave the police officers unbridled discretion and, therefore, illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the compounds. On the other hand, the instant case involved a single structure, and, unlike in the Estrada and Asuncion cases, was readily identifiable to the police officers serving the warrant from the other structures similarly located along the street where petitioner's house was located. In other words, the description of petitioner's house was sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent a search of other structures located within the surrounding area or community.

What is therefore involved in this case is a singular structure containing multiple family dwellings or units therein – a fact which was discovered only after the search warrant was enforced and the search of petitioner's house was conducted by the police officers. The pith of the issue therefore lies in the validity of a warrant which appears to have authorized the search of the entire premises of a supposed multiple-occupancy structure containing several units occupied by other persons other than petitioner.

This Court finds that the omission of the warrant to (a) indicate that the place to be searched contained five rooms which were separately occupied by petitioner and her siblings; and (b) confine the search to petitioner's unit is inconsequential and, therefore, does not affect the warrant's validity for the following reasons:

First, the units or rooms where petitioner and her siblings lived all form an integral part of the house, which, as already discussed, was sufficiently described with particularity under the warrant. The rooms inside the house, which were in fact occupied by family members of petitioner, cannot be treated separately as they form part of the house where petitioner actually resided.

Prudente v. Dayrit44 is instructive on this point, viz.:

Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP.

The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.

People v. Tuan45 also teaches that the description of the place to be searched under the warrant described as the "house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City," which contained several rooms, was specific enough and, therefore, satisfied the constitutional requirement of definiteness:

In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough.1âшphi1 There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellant's residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.46

Second, even assuming that an ambiguity or inaccuracy in the interior description of the place to be searched may affect the validity of the warrant,47 such finding, which only emerged after the warrant was issued, has no bearing on its validity or invalidity.

That the house of petitioner was composed of several units separately occupied by her siblings was discovered only after the search warrant was enforced and the search of petitioner's house was conducted by the police officers. Notably, PO2 Avila could not have known or detected the multi-unit character of petitioner's house prior to the actual search.

On this point, it has been held that the requirement of particularity as to the things to be seized does not require technical accuracy in the description of the property to be seized, and that a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow it to be described.48 The same principle should be applied in the case at bench. It would be unreasonable to expect PO2 Avila, or an outsider such as Labrador for that matter, to have extensive knowledge of the interior set-up or floor plan of petitioner's house without, however, having apparent authority or opportunity to access the premises prior to the search.

In this regard, the Court holds that the validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the pieces of information made available to Judge Morga at the time PO2 Avila applied for the issuance of the search warrant which, in this case, were sufficiently supported by the sketches of Labrador, and the testimonies of PO2 Avila and Labrador, who were, in fact, personally examined by Judge Morga in the form of searching questions and answers. Quoting Justice John Paul Stevens' opinion in Maryland v. Garrison49:

Those items of evidence that emerge after the warrant is issued have no bearing on whether or not a warrant was validly issued. Just as a discovery of the contraband cannot validate a warrant invalid when issued, so is it equally clear that the discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant. The validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the information that the officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover and disclose, to the issuing Magistrate."

G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020

MERLINA R. DIAZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jul2020/gr_213875_2020.html