MA. CARMINIA C.
CALDERON REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN FACT, MARYCRIS V. BALDEVIA VS. JOSE
ANTONIO F. ROXAS AND COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 185595, January 09, 2013.
“x x x.
This Court has laid
down the distinction between interlocutory and final orders, as follows:
x x x A “final”
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more
to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription.
Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the
controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the
parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately,
of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes “final” or,
to use the established and more distinctive term, “final and executory.”
x x x x
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does
not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory” e.g.,
an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a
motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment
thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or
inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a “final”
judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
“interlocutory” order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an
appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the
case.1
[Emphasis supplied]
The assailed orders
relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support
in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the
decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are
therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they
consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the
ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody,
support and conjugal assets.
The Rules of Court
provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente litewhich
may be availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at
any time prior to the judgment or final order.2
On March 4, 2003,
this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders3 which shall govern the issuance of provisional orders during the
pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of
voidable marriage and legal separation. These include orders for spousal
support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold departure,
protection and administration of common property.
Petitioner contends
that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the assailed
orders pertains only to private respondent’s motion to reduce support which was
granted, and to her own motion to increase support, which was denied.
Petitioner points out that the ruling on support in arrears which have remained
unpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment under the May 19, 1998
Order and related orders were in the nature of final orders assailable by
ordinary appeal considering that the orders referred to under Sections 1 and 4
of Rule 61 of the Rules of Court can apply only prospectively. Thus, from the
moment the accrued amounts became due and demandable, the orders under which
the amounts were made payable by private respondent have ceased to be
provisional and have become final.
We disagree.
The word
interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the
end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision
of the whole controversy.4 An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and
leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case. In
contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the
action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same
action.5 Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory
is not dependent on compliance or non- compliance by a party to its directive,
as what petitioner suggests. It is also important to emphasize the temporary or
provisional nature of the assailed orders.
Provisional remedies
are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may
be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects,
of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute
temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they are
ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result
of the main action.6 The subject orders on the matter of
support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Moreover, private
respondent’s obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by the RTC
in the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired
in the early stage of the proceedings when the court cited the private
respondent in contempt of court and ordered him arrested for his
refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente lite.7 A few
years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support while
petitioner filed her own motion to increase the same, and in addition sought
spousal support and support in arrears. This fact underscores the provisional
character of the order granting support pendente lite. Petitioner’s
theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the
arrearages incurred by private respondent is therefore untenable.
Under Section 1,
Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, appeal from
interlocutory orders is not allowed. Said provision reads:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking
relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,
confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any
other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several
parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party
complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal
therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied.)
The remedy against
an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen
the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC,
petitioner’s appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.
X x x.”
