1. In the analogous case of RICARDO QUIAMBAO vs. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, and FELIPE GAZA, LAND AUTHORITY, G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988, the Supreme Court discussed the effect of a PREJUDICIAL QUESTION vis-à-vis a pending ejectment case.
1.1. In the said case the sole question was “whether or not the administrative case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.”
1.2. After defining the general and specific concepts of “prejudicial question” as understood in law, the Supreme Court held that although the two (2) actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, and thus, technically, there was no prejudicial question to speak of, nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the “intimate correlation between said two  proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case”.
1.3. The Supreme Court held therein:
“x x x.
X x x. For while it may be true that private respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their favor.
Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private respondents would have every
right to eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.
X x x.”
1.4. Thus, the Supreme Court, in the said case, held that faced with these distinct possibilities, “the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case”. It added:
“x x x.
X x x. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed. 2
X x x.”
1.5. The Supreme Court also stated that “the existence in the said case of the same considerations of identity of parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties' right of possession before the ejectment case may be properly determined” justified the application of the prejudicial question rule in the ejectment case.