ARIEL T. LIM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014
“x x x.
Records reveal that petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check
Nos. 0013813 and 0013814, dated June 30, 1998 and July 15, 1998, respectively,
payable to CASH, in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PI00,000.00) for
each check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie Castor (Castor) as his campaign
donation to the latter's candidacy in the elections of 1998. It was Castor who
ordered the delivery of printing materials and used petitioner's checks to pay
for the same. Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too late,
Castor instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the
two checks. Thus, the checks were dishonored by the bank because of said order
and during trial, when the bank officer was presented on the witness stand, he
admitted that said checks were drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). Private
complainant Magna B. Badiee sent two demand letters to petitioner, dated July
20, 1998 and July 23, 1998 and, subsequently, private complainant filed a
complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Prosecutor. After the
lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters, and after
receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a
replacement check dated September 8, 1998 in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee was able to encash
said replacement check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after
petitioner had paid the amount of the bounced checks, two Informations were
filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) x x x.
On September 12, 2006, the MeTC promulgated its Decision
finding petitioner guilty of two (2) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), and on July
20, 2007, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this court therefore
modifies the lower court decision with respect to criminal case no. 327138
(07-249931), because the lower court of Manila has no jurisdiction to try and
decide cases where the essential ingredients of the crime charged happened in
Quezon City. The decision of the lower court with respect to criminal case no.
327138 (07-249931) is ordered vacated and set aside for lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court findings that
accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of BP 22 with
respect to criminal case no. 07-24992 is affirmed and is ordered to pay a fine
of P100,000.00 plus costs. No findings as to civil liability because the
court agrees with the lower court that the check was paid, is affirmed and
there is no cogent reason to disturb the same. In case of failure to pay fine,
the accused shall undergo subsidiary imprisonment of not more than six (6)
months.
SO ORDERED.5
A petition for review was then filed with the Court of
Appeals, and on June 30, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision affirming in
toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied per Resolution dated January 4, 2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits that
jurisprudence dictates the dismissal of the criminal case against him on the
ground that he has fully paid the amount of the dishonored checks even before
the Informations against him were filed incourt. Petitioner mainly relies on Griffith
v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 878 (2002).6 The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) likewise recommends the acquittal of petitioner, opining that Griffith7 is applicable to the present case.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
In Griffith,the Court acquitted the accused therein due
to the fact that two years before the filing of the Information for violation
of B.P. No. 22, the accused had, in effect, paid the complainant an amount
greater than the value of the bounced checks. The CA held that the factual
circumstances in Griffith are dissimilar from those in the present case. The
Court disagrees with such conclusion.
The CA found Griffith inapplicable to the present case,
because the checks subject of this case are personal checks, while the check
involved in Griffithwas a corporate check and, hence, some confusion or
miscommunication could easily occur between the signatories of the check and
the corporate treasurer. Although the factual circumstances in the present
case are not exactly the same as those in Griffith, it should be noted that the
same kind of confusion giving rise to petitioner's mistake very well existed in
the present case. Here, the check was issued by petitioner merely as a
campaign contribution to Castor's candidacy. As found by the trial court, it
was Castor who instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order
for the two checks because the campaign materials, for which the checks were
used as payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner relied on Castor's word
and complied with his instructions, as it was Castor who was supposed to take
delivery of said materials. Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner made the
mistake of readily complying with the instruction to stop payment since he
believed Castor's word that there is no longer any valid reason to pay
complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless, two
months after receiving the demand letter from private complainant and just
several days after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor,
accused issued a replacement check which was successfully encashed by private
complainant.
The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the
amount of the checks only after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the
Prosecutor, which supposedly shows that petitioner was motivated to pay not
because he wanted to settle his obligation but because he wanted to avoid
prosecution. This reasoning is tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused
therein did not even voluntarily pay the value of the dishonored checks; rather,
the complainant was paid from the proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of the
accused's property. In said case, the Court did not differentiate as to
whether payment was made before or after the complaint had been filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor. It only mattered that the amount stated in the
dishonored check had actually been paid before the Information against the
accused was filed in court. In this case, petitioner even voluntarily paid
value of the bounced checks. The Court, therefore, sees no justification for
differentiating this case from that of Griffith. Records show that both in
Griffith and in this case, petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored
checks before the filing of the Informations in court. Verily, there is no
reason why the same liberality granted to the accused in Griffith should not
likewise be extended to herein petitioner. The precept enunciated in Griffith
is herein reiterated, to wit:
While we agree with the private
respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of
worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we
should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the
application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the
law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law
ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law
also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor’s
criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it.
The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover
the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that
holding the debtor’s president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two
years after said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or
equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money
value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid
two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this
petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly
convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. x x x8 (Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International Bank, 575 Phil. 485 (2008)9 the foregoing principle articulated in
Griffith was the precedent cited to justify the acquittal of the accused in
said case. Therein, the Court enumerated the elements for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 being "(1) The accused makes, draws or issues a check to apply to
account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he
or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."10 To facilitate proving the second
element, the law created a prima facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds or credit, which is established when it is shown that
the drawer of the check was notified of its dishonor and, within five banking
days thereafter, failed to fully pay the amount of the check or make
arrangements for its full payment. If the check, however, is made good or the
drawer pays the value of the check within the five-day period, then the
presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential elements of the
violation is no longer present and the drawer may no longer be indicted for
B.P. Blg. 22. Said payment within the period prescribed by the law is a
complete defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the
dishonored check during the five-day grace period would exculpate the accused
from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further elaborated
in Tan:
In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that were the creditor
had collected more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks
representing rental arrearages, holding the debtor's president to answer for a
criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22 two years after the said collection is no
longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations. In that
case, the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the grace period but two years
prior to the institution of the criminal case, the payment collected from the
proceeds of the foreclosure and auction sale of the petitioner's impounded
properties, with more than a million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of
the petitioner.
x x x x.
In the present case, PCIB already
extracted its proverbial pound of flesh by receiving and keeping in possession
the four buses – trust properties surrendered by petitioner in about mid 1991
and March 1992 pursuant to Section 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the estimated
value of which was "about P6.6 million." It thus appears that
the total amount of the dishonored checks – P1,785,855.75 – , x x x was
more than fully satisfied priorto the transmittal and receiptof the July 9,
1992 letter of demand. In keeping with jurisprudence, the Court then considers
such payment of the dishonored checks to have obliterated the criminal
liability of petitioner.
It is consistent rule that penal
statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. And since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court
must determine whether the application of the penal law is consistent with the
purpose and reason of the law. x x x11 (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check,
if made beyond the 5-day period provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally
not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned cases show that the Court
acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the
crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove
to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in
Tan,12petitioner should not be penalized although
all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to bepresent. The fact
that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check
after having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should
have forestalled the filing of the Information incourt. The spirit of the law
which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the credibility and stability of
the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have evidently
made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before
charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks
before the filing of the informations has already attained the purpose of the
law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of
the bounced check after the information has been filed in court would no
longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from the commencement of the criminal
proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the
accused had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of
his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and compelling
reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law
should be applied to its full extent.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in
this case should be well differentiated from cases where the accused is charged
with estafa under Article 315, par.
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by
postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage and
deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the check is merely the
accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the
dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely
satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.
In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be
exonerated from the imposition of penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as
he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months before
the filing of Informations with the court. Such a course of action is more
in keeping with justice and equity.
X x x.”
