1.
In the case of ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANANTAN,
herein represented by GILBERT MANANTAN vs. ANICETO SOMERA, G.R. No. 145867,
April 7, 2009, involving unlawful detainer, as in the instant case, and
citing Sec. 1, Rule 70, it was held that “a person deprived of the possession
of any land or building xxx against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied xxx” may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper first-level trial court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs.
1.1.
The
Supreme Court held therein that unlawful detainer is as an action “may be filed
by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.”
1.2.
The
SC stated that in unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was
“originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account
of an express or implied contract between them.” However, defendant’s possession became
illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property “due
to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their contract,
and defendant refused to heed such demand”.
1.3.
We further wrote
from the said ruling:
“x x x.
Well-settled
is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the
action, are determined by the allegations in the complaint.
To vest the court with the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant from the land in an action for unlawful detainer, it is necessary that
the complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing
attributes of unlawful detainer cases, as this proceeding is summary in
nature. The complaint must show on its
face enough ground to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony.
Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court may
acquire jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer, it
is essential that the complaint specifically allege the facts constitutive of
unlawful detainer. The jurisdictional
facts must appear on the face of the complaint.
When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, an action for
unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and, thus, the municipal trial
court or metropolitan trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.
X x x.
Further, it
appears from the allegations in the Complaint that the respondent was already
in possession of the disputed portion at the time Manantan bought the subject
property from the Bayot family, and it was only after the conduct of a
relocation survey, which supposedly showed that respondent was encroaching on
the subject property, did Manantan begin asserting her claim of ownership over
the portion occupied and used by respondent.
Clearly, respondent’s possession of the disputed portion was
not pursuant to any contract, express or implied, with Manantan, and,
resultantly, respondent’s right of possession over the disputed portion is not
subject to expiration or termination. At
no point can it be said that respondent’s possession of the disputed portion
ceased to be legal and became an unlawful withholding of the property from Manantan.
Since the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467 failed to satisfy on its face the
jurisdictional requirements for an action for unlawful detainer, the Court of
Appeals was correct in holding that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the said
Complaint and should have dismissed the same.
There is no possible argument around the lack of jurisdiction of MTCC
over Civil Case No. 10467. In Laresma v. Abellana, the Court
pronounced:
It is axiomatic that the nature of an
action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was
commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature
of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court
which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the
subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or
even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction
over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu
proprio. A decision of the
court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically
become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or
collaterally.
X x x.”
