Monday, August 3, 2015

Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court may acquire jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the complaint specifically allege the facts constitutive of unlawful detainer. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, an action for unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and, thus, the municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.





1.       In the case of ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANANTAN, herein represented by GILBERT MANANTAN vs. ANICETO SOMERA, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009, involving unlawful detainer, as in the instant case, and citing Sec. 1, Rule 70, it was held that “a person deprived of the possession of any land or building xxx  against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied xxx” may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper first-level trial court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

1.1.           The Supreme Court held therein that unlawful detainer is as an action “may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.”

1.2.          The SC stated that in unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was “originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them.”  However, defendant’s possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property “due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand”

1.3.          We further wrote from the said ruling:

 “x x x.
Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by the allegations in the complaint.  To vest the court with the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant from the land in an action for unlawful detainer, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing attributes of unlawful detainer cases, as this proceeding is summary in nature.  The complaint must show on its face enough ground to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.

Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court may acquire jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the complaint specifically allege the facts constitutive of unlawful detainer.  The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint.  When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, an action for unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and, thus, the municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.
X x x.
Further, it appears from the allegations in the Complaint that the respondent was already in possession of the disputed portion at the time Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot family, and it was only after the conduct of a relocation survey, which supposedly showed that respondent was encroaching on the subject property, did Manantan begin asserting her claim of ownership over the portion occupied and used by respondent. 

Clearly, respondent’s possession of the disputed portion was not pursuant to any contract, express or implied, with Manantan, and, resultantly, respondent’s right of possession over the disputed portion is not subject to expiration or termination.  At no point can it be said that respondent’s possession of the disputed portion ceased to be legal and became an unlawful withholding of the property from Manantan.  
Since the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467 failed to satisfy on its face the jurisdictional requirements for an action for unlawful detainer, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the said Complaint and should have dismissed the same.  There is no possible argument around the lack of jurisdiction of MTCC over Civil Case No. 10467.  In Laresma v. Abellana, the Court pronounced:

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced.  Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action.  Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties.  If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu

proprio.  A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become final and executory.  Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.

X x x.”