MAYOR MARCIAL
VARGAS AND ENGR. RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO VS. FORTUNATO CAJUCOM, G.R. No.
171095, June 22, 2015.
The Issues:
Whether or not the
writ of execution should be quashed.
The Ruling:
The Court is now
confronted with the singular issue of whether grounds exist to quash the
subject writ of execution.
It is a consistent
practice that once a judgment has become final and executory, a writ of
execution is issued as a matter of course, in the absence of any order
restraining its issuance.1 In addition, even a writ
of demolition, if the case calls for it, is ancillary to the process of execution and is logically also issued as a
consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued.2
Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court is clear:
Section 1. Execution
upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal
has been duly perfected. (la)
If the appeal has
been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee,
submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or
final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with
notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court
may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires,
direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.3
Stated differently,
once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution.4 Its issuance is, in fact, the trial court’s ministerial duty, the only limitation being that the writ must conform substantially to every
essential particular of the judgment promulgated, more particularly,
the orders or decrees in the dispositive
portion of the decision.5 Even the holding in abeyance of the issuance of a writ of execution of a
final and executory judgment can be considered abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.6
In sum, this Court
has explained the principle as follows:
It is not disputed
that the judgment sought to be executed in the case at bar had already become
final and executory. It is fundamental that the prevailing party in a
litigation may, at any time within five (5) years after the entry thereof, have
a writ of execution issued for its enforcement and the court not only has the
power and authority to order its execution but it is its ministerial duty to do
so. It has also been held that the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of
execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its stay,
for, as a general rule, the
parties will not be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the execution
by raising new issues of fact or of law, except when there had been a change in
the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable or when it
appears that the controversy has ever been submitted to the judgment of the
court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently
issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong
party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the
writ has been issued without authority. Defendant-appellant has not
shown that she falls in any of the situations afore-mentioned. Ordinarily, an
order of execution of a final judgment is not appealable. Otherwise, as was said by this Court in Molina
v. De la Riva, a case could never end. Once a court renders a final
judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed
resolved and its judicial function as regards any matter related to the
controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its judgment is purely
a ministerial phase of adjudication.
The nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the prevailing party is
fully satisfied from the properties of the loser is generally ministerial.7
And equally settled
is the rule that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.8 It may
no longer be modified in any respect, except
to correct clerical errors or to make mine pro tune entries, or when it is a
void judgment.9 Outside of these exceptions, the court which rendered judgment only
has the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution.10 A
decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case regardless of
any claim that it is erroneous.11 Any
amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory
judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose.12 Thus, an order of execution which
varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.13
In the case at bar,
there is no dispute that the trial court’s decision had become final and
executory, as petitioners themselves did
not appeal the same. In the current petition, neither is there an
allegation that the judgment is a void one. But even if there is such an
allegation, the issue is a settled one, as this Court itself, in the petition
for annulment of judgment filed by petitioner’s co-obligors, i.e.,
Punoet al., had upheld the judgment rather than declare the same void.
That petition also alleged lack of jurisdiction and raised other issues which
are similarly raised in the instant petition.
Therefore, at this
late stage, nothing more may be done to disturb the said final judgment.
As for the
regularity of the issuance of the writ of execution itself, it is uncontested
that all the requirements for the issuance of such a writ, as laid down in the
rules, were followed in the case a bar. No issue was raised before the trial
court which qualifies as an exception to the general rule that parties may not
object to its issuance. Instead, for the most part, the petition appears to
pray for a quashal of the writ of execution on grounds that, when closely
examined, go into the merits of the
case and the judgment being executed and are not based on any defect in the
writ of execution itself or in its issuance.
To illustrate, petitioners
cite the following as grounds for the quashal of the writ of execution: (1)
that it allegedly would compel the municipal engineer to exercise the powers
and duties of the mayor; (2) that it forces the mayor to perform a
discretionary duty; (3) that there was no exhaustion of administrative
remedies; and, (4) that the judgment obligee had no well-defined, clear and
certain right to warrant the grant of mandamus.
Such grounds,
however, go into the substance and
merits of the case which had been decided with finality, and have no
bearing on the validity of the issuance of the writ of execution. They raise
issues which have been properly joined and addressed by the trial court in its
decision. But at this late stage of execution, tackling those matters is a re-litigation of those issues, which
no court can perform without offending well-settled principles. Essentially,
arguments as to these issues are proper
for an appeal, a remedy which none of the petitioners and the other
judgment-obligors have taken. Instead, petitioners’ co-defendants in the case,
the other judgment-obligors Puno, et al., filed a petition to annul the judgment, also
raising the trial court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction and the same arguments
as aforementioned, but such petition was denied by the CA, which denial was
affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court. Hence, to this Court, the final
judgment has become the law of the case which is now immovable. The rudiments
of fair play, justice, and due process require that parties cannot raise for
the first time on appeal from a denial of a motion to quash a writ of execution
issues which they could have raised but never did during the trial and even on
appeal from the decision of the trial court.14
The simple matter is
that petitioners herein may not do indirectly, by assailing the writ of
execution, what they cannot do directly, which is attacking the final,
immutable and unalterable judgment of the RTC. They may not raise in their
opposition to the writ of execution issues that they should have raised in the
case during the trial proper or against the judgment via an appeal. They may
not object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except under
the following circumstances:
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(1)
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the writ of
execution varies the judgment;
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(2)
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there has been a
change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;
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(3)
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execution is
sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
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(4)
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it appears that
the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;
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(5)
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the terms of the
judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or
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(6)
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it appears that
the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective
in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt
has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without
authority.15
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For the most part,
the petition does not clearly state whether the subject writ of execution falls
under any of the above exceptions. It raised two grounds, i.e.,
that the writ is incapable of being enforced and that it varies the judgment,
which can be interpreted as falling under the exceptions above, but these
grounds as applied to the case at bar simply lack merit.
X x x.”
