SPOUSES BENJAMIN C. MAMARIL AND SONIA P. MAMARIL VS. THE BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AIB SECURITY AGENCY, INC., CESARIO PEÑA,* AND VICENTE GADDI, G.R. No. 179382, January 14, 2013
“x x x.
Notwithstanding, however, Sps. Mamaril insist that BSP should be held liable for their loss on the basis of the Guard Service Contract that the latter entered into with AIB and their parking agreement with BSP.
Such contention cannot be sustained.
Article 1311 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.
Thus, in order that a third person benefited by the second paragraph of Article 1311, referred to as a stipulation pour autrui, may demand its fulfillment, the following requisites must concur: (1) There is a stipulation in favor of a third person; (2) The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) The contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person – the favor is not merely incidental; (4) The favor is unconditional and uncompensated; (5) The third person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor before its revocation; and (6) The contracting parties do not represent, or are not authorized, by the third party.8 However, none of the foregoing elements obtains in this case.
It is undisputed that Sps. Mamaril are not parties to the Guard Service Contract. Neither did the subject agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui. And even if there was, Sps. Mamaril did not convey any acceptance thereof. Thus, under the principle of relativity of contracts, they cannot validly claim any rights or favor under the said agreement.9 As correctly found by the CA:
First, the Guard Service Contract between defendant-appellant BSP and defendant AIB Security Agency is purely between the parties therein. It may be observed that although the whereas clause of the said agreement provides that defendant-appellant desires security and protection for its compound and all properties therein, as well as for its officers and employees, while inside the premises, the same should be correlated with paragraph 3(a) thereof which provides that the security agency shall indemnify defendant-appellant for all losses and damages suffered by it attributable to any act or negligence of the former’s guards.
Otherwise stated, defendant-appellant sought the services of defendant AIB Security Agency for the purpose of the security and protection of its properties, as well as that of its officers and employees, so much so that in case of loss of [sic] damage suffered by it as a result of any act or negligence of the guards, the security agency would then be held responsible therefor. There is absolutely nothing in the said contract that would indicate any obligation and/or liability on the part of the parties therein in favor of third persons such as herein plaintiffs-appellees.10
Moreover, the Court concurs with the finding of the CA that the contract between the parties herein was one of lease11 as defined under Article 164312 of the Civil Code. It has been held that the act of parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease.13 Even in a majority of American cases, it has been ruled that where a customer simply pays a fee, parks his car in any available space in the lot, locks the car and takes the key with him, the possession and control of the car, necessary elements in bailment, do not pass to the parking lot operator, hence, the contractual relationship between the parties is one of lease.14
In the instant case, the owners parked their six (6) passenger jeepneys inside the BSP compound for a monthly fee of P300.00 for each unit and took the keys home with them. Hence, a lessor-lessee relationship indubitably existed between them and BSP. On this score, Article 1654 of the Civil Code provides that “[t]he lessor (BSP) is obliged: (1) to deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to render it fit for the use intended; (2) to make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use to which it has been devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary; and (3) to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract.” In relation thereto, Article 1664 of the same Code states that “[t]he lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct action against the intruder.” Here, BSP was not remiss in its obligation to provide Sps. Mamaril a suitable parking space for their jeepneys as it even hired security guards to secure the premises; hence, it should not be held liable for the loss suffered by Sps. Mamaril.
It bears to reiterate that the subject loss was caused by the negligence of the security guards in allowing a stranger to drive out plaintiffs-appellants’ vehicle despite the latter’s instructions that only their authorized drivers may do so.
Moreover, the agreement with respect to the ingress and egress of Sps. Mamaril’s vehicles were coordinated only with AIB and its security guards,15 without the knowledge and consent of BSP. Accordingly, the mishandling of the parked vehicles that resulted in herein complained loss should be recovered only from the tort feasors (Peña and Gaddi) and their employer, AIB; and not against the lessor, BSP.16
X x x.”