GERARDO A. MOSQUERA vs. HON. DELIA H.
PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, City of Makati, Metro Manila, HON. FELICIDAD Y. NAVARRO-QUIAMBAO, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65,
City of Makati, Metro Manila, and MARK F. JALANDONI, G.R. No. 121180, July 5,
1996.
“x x x.
Petitioner's contention is that, because the direction and
control of criminal prosecutions are vested in the public prosecutor, the motion for reconsideration of the
order of October 13, 1994, which the private prosecutor filed without the conformity by the public
prosecutor, was a nullity and did not prevent the order of dismissal from
becoming final. Consequently, the MeTC gravely abused its discretion in
afterward reinstating the information.
Undoubtedly private respondent, as complainant, has an
interest in the maintenance of the criminal prosecution. The right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court
which deprives them of due process has always been recognized, the only
limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would
place the accused in double jeopardy. 6 x
x x. In Martinez v. Court
of Appeals, 7 where, through the Chief Justice,
we held:
Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the
1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a final judgment or
order in a criminal case is granted to "any party," except when the
accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy.
In People v. Guido,
[57 Phil. 52 (1932)] this Court ruled that the word "party" must be
understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other
persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal
proceeding. Thus, the party injured by
the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the
court which is derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from
the offense. The right of the
offended party to file a special civil action of prohibition and certiorari from an
[interlocutory] order rendered in a criminal case was likewise recognized in
the cases of Paredes v. Gopengco [29 SCRA 688 (1969)]
and People v. Calo, Jr., [186 SCRA 620 (1990)]
which held that "offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest
and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil
action of prohibition and certiorari under
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal
construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object. .
. .
Petitioner cites the following statement in Cabral v. Puno 8 in
support of his contention that private respondent has no personality to file
the motion in question:
While it is true that the offended
party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not
stop the running of the period for appeal [from the order of dismissal of the
information]. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the
motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case
through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the
Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal
could have interrupted the period for appeal.
The case of Cabral, however, differs materially
from this case. In Cabral, the offended party had lost
his right to intervene because prior to the filing of the criminal case, he had
instituted a civil action arising from the same act subject of the criminal
case. On the other hand, in the case at bar, the right of private
respondent to intervene in the criminal prosecution is well nigh beyond
question as he had neither instituted
a separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to do so. 9
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that private respondent has the legal personality to file the motion for
reconsideration in the trial court.
X x x.”
