"x x x.
Anent the second assigned error, petitioner posits that the CA erred in affirming the said RTC Decision and in modifying the penalty imposed upon him since the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of estafa. He argues that Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC requires that the person charged was given juridical possession of the thing misappropriated. Here, he did not acquire juridical possession of the things allegedly misappropriated because his relation to SPI’s properties was only by virtue of his official functions as a corporate officer. It is actually SPI, on whose behalf he has acted, that has the juridical possession of the said properties.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand counters that the prosecution’s evidence has fully established all the elements of the crime charged. Based on SPI’s records, petitioner received from it various equipment of SPI on several occasions for the sole purpose of manufacturing underwires for brassieres. However after the conduct of an audit in December 1996, petitioner failed to properly account therefor.
Petitioner’s arguments fail to persuade.
Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC:
1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return, the same;
2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.[23]
All these elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution.
Petitioner asserts that as majority stockholder of TAC, he entered into a business transaction with SPI wherein it would fabricate bending machines and spare parts for the latter. Under their agreement, SPI would provide the necessary components to be used in the fabrication as well as the electronic devices while work would be done at petitioner’s premises. Pursuant to this, petitioner admitted to having received from SPI an electronic transformer, electronic box and a computer box.[24] When petitioner, however, was not able to finish the work allegedly due to his dismissal from SPI, the latter demanded for the return of its properties. However, petitioner did not heed the demand and simply kept the properties as lien for his claims against SPI.[25]
From petitioner’s own assertions, the existence of the first and fourth of the aforementioned elements is very clear. SPI’s properties were received by the petitioner in trust. He received them for a particular purpose, that is, for the fabrication of bending machines and spare parts for SPI. And when SPI made a demand for their return after petitioner’s alleged dismissal therefrom, petitioner deliberately ignored the same.
The Court cannot agree with petitioner’s postulation that he did not acquire juridical possession of SPI’s properties since his relation with the same was only by virtue of his official function as SPI’s corporate officer. As borne out by the records, the equipment subject matter of this case were received in trust by petitioner from SPI to be utilized in the fabrication of bending machines. Petitioner was given absolute option on how to use them without any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, petitioner acquired not only physical possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. As the Court held in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals:[26]
When the money, goods or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. x x x
With regard to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the prosecution was able to prove this through circumstantial evidence. “Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.”[27] The “failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.”[28] As mentioned, petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the properties of SPI which were received by him in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioner’s own personal use. Even if petitioner merely retained the properties for the purpose of preserving his right of lien over them, same is immaterial because, to reiterate, failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use. As correctly noted by the CA:
We are not impressed by appellant’s excuse. We note that SPI’s demand for the return of the properties subject of this case was made on January 14, 1997. At that time, appellant was no longer the managing director of SPI, he having been terminated from his position on November 19, 1996. This observation, coupled with SPI’s demand for the return of its equipment and materials, show that appellant had lost his right to retain the said properties and the fact that he failed to return or at least account for them raises the presumption of misappropriation and conversion. x x x[29]
Lastly, it is obvious that petitioner’s failure to return SPI’s properties valued at P191,665.35 caused damage and prejudice to the latter.
x x x."
