"Double jeopardy does not attach to void judgments; the OSG correctly filed a Rule 65 Petition to assail the verdict of acquittal of the Regional Trial Court
Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution protects all persons from being placed in double jeopardy of punishment for a single offense:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
It means that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice, and conscience.[41] It ensures that the government does not abuse its powers by repeatedly prosecuting the same accused for the same charge. People v. Hon. Velasco[42] elucidated:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State. . . ." Thus, Green expressed the concern that "[t]he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing stale of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."[43] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Indeed, it is a basic principle of law that the rule against double jeopardy proscribes an appeal from a judgment of acquittal on the merits from being filed. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in an appellate court, will put the accused a second time in jeopardy for the same offense.[44]
Thus, XXX argues that the People violated his right against double jeopardy when it filed a Rule 65 petition assailing his acquittal.
We do not agree.
It is settled that a judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court below acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.[45]
The People was able to fulfill this burden in its petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered "grave," discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion attends when the trial court manifestly disregarded the basic rules and procedures, or acted with obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure.[46]
Contrary to XXX's position, the trial court failed to justify its verdict of acquittal. In casting doubt on the evidence of the prosecution, the trial court merely pointed out the circumstances of the parties at the time the criminal complaint was filed. To recall, the trial court hinged its ruling on the fact that the complaint was belatedly filed five years after the separation of the parties; that XXX and AAA were civil to each other despite their separation; and XXX consistently provided support for BBB.[47]
These, however, are matters that do not delve into the essence of the offense. Worse, they are not evidence that dispel the mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA as a result of her husband's extramarital affair. It is indeed perplexing how, as between the trial court's bare conjectures arising from the circumstances of the case and the hard evidence showing AAA's mental and emotional suffering (i.e., the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Lambuson) and XXX's marital infidelity (i.e., his own admission, the photos and posts from Twitter, and certificates of live birth of MMM and NNN), the former prevailed.
Worse, it does not escape the Court that part of the trial court's explanation that the marital infidelity of XXX was committed after he and AAA separated de facto, hence, the same falls outside the scope of Republic Act No. 9262.[48] This is a mistaken notion. Legal separation entitles the parties to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;[49] more so, here, where the separation of the parties is merely in fact and not by legal decree. Verily, any extramarital relation maintained by any of the spouses still constitutes marital infidelity, which is one of the means of committing psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262.
By disregarding the foregoing basic principles of law and rudimentary appreciation of evidence, we find no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in granting the petition for certiorari filed by the OSG on behalf of the People."
XXX, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 232190, August 20, 2025.
