x x x.
1. The former counsel for the defendants (deleted for privacy reasons) committed a grave mistake in waiving the preliminary conference before the Branch Clerk of Court or in not moving for the re-opening thereof during the subsequent pretrial conference held on March 12, 2007 at 8:30 AM.
It was a grave and gross mistake that injured the basic and constitutional substantive and procedural due process rights of the defendants because under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004, RE: PROPOSED RULE ON GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE OF DEPOSITION-DISCOVERY MEASURES (in relation to: Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999), Part I (A) (2) (d) thereof provides, as a general rule, that “…no evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a party's evidence-in-chief other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the court for good cause shown…”.
2. Part I (A) (3) of the aforecited A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004 stresses that importance of the mandatory preliminary conference as a procedure and dictates its technical processes, thus:
X x x.
3. x x x. Before the continuance, the Judge may refer the case to the Branch COC for a preliminary conference to assist the parties in reaching a settlement, to mark the documents or exhibits to be presented by the parties and copies thereof to be attached to the records after comparison and to consider such other matters as may aid in its prompt disposition.6
During the preliminary conference, the Branch COC shall also ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of the documents marked as exhibits. The proceedings during .the preliminary conference shall be recorded in the "Minutes of Preliminary Conference" to be signed by both parties and/or counsel x x x.
The minutes of preliminary conference and the exhibits shall be attached by the Branch COC to the case record before the pre-trial.
X x x.
3. For the undersigned new counsel for the defendants to be able to fully litigate the claims, counterclaims, theory, defenses and arguments of his clients (defendants), there is a need for leave of court to withdraw the waiver orally made on March 12, 2007 by the former counsel for the defendants and to re-open the preliminary conference before the Branch Clerk of Court. The suggestion would not only serve the ends of justice but would put some procedural order in the presentation of defense evidence, thus, resulting in economy of time during the main trial stage and the convenience of all concerned, including the Court itself.
4. The defendants cite hereinbelow analogous jurisprudence showing the virtue of liberality that the Supreme Court vests on matters of harmless procedure, e.g., the re-opening of a preliminary conference prayed for in this pleading, more so, if such a harmless procedural request is intended in good faith to restore some procedural order for purposes of defense litigation management. Thus:
a. RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, respondent. G.R. No. 133240, November 15, 2000
X x x.
Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the actual merits of the case to be speedily determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment
to the complaint was made before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
X x x.
b. RODRIGO QUIRAO, MONICA QUIRAO, ROBERTO QUIRAO, EDILBERTO QUIRAO, JESUS GOLE, GERARDO QUIRAO, LAMBERTO VALDEZ & FEDERICO QUIRAO, petitioners, vs. LYDIA QUIRAO & LEOPOLDO QUIRAO, JR., G.R. No. 148120, October 24, 2003.
X x x.
In the case at bar, petitioners filed their motion for leave of court to admit amended answer only after respondents have rested their case. Petitioners argue that the error was due to the oversight of the three previous counsels. Petitioners’ fourth counsel also claims that he learned of the alternative defense late as his clients (petitioners herein) did not inform him of the Deed of Sale. Allegedly, they relied on the advice of their previous counsels that the said deed of sale “was a mere scrap of paper because it was not signed by Carlito de Juan.” Respondents contend that petitioners’ motion is too late in the day.
Petitioners’ motion for admission of amended answer may be a little tardy but this by itself is not a cause for its denial. Their amended answer alleges that respondents no longer own the subject property having sold the same to de Juan who, in turn, sold the property to petitioners. These allegations, if correct, are vital to the disposition of the case at bar. The interest of justice and equity demand that they be considered to avoid a result that is iniquitous. Truth cannot be barred by technical rules. For this reason, our ruling case law holds that amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice so that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to prevent the circuity of action.
We should always bear in mind that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially on technical matters, which
tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from the courts.
X x x.
c. DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 103276, April 11, 1996
X x x.
Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality. 28 x x x.
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation". 30 And the grim reality petitioner will surely face, if we do not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities in this instance, is the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after all. More so, considering that petitioner's record as public servant remained unscathed until his prosecution.
Indeed, "while guilt shall not escape, innocence should not suffer". 31
In resume, this is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render justice where justice is due — to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. To borrow Justice Padilla's words in "People v. CA, et. al.", 32 (where substantial justice was upheld anew in allowing therein accused's appeal despite the withdrawal of his notice of appeal and his subsequent escape from confinement) that "if only to truly make the courts really genuine instruments in the administration of justice", the Court believes it imperative, in order to assure against any possible miscarriage of justice resulting from petitioner's failure to present his crucial evidence through no fault of his, that this case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner's evidence.
X x x.
