1. In the case of ERLINDA ABRAGAN, et. al. vs. vs. Atty. MAXIMO G. RODRIGUEZ, A.C. No. 4346. , April 3, 2002, it was held that “lawyers violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting interests” and that “they taint not only their own professional practice, but the entire legal profession itself”. Thus:
X x x.
Having said that, we find, however, that respondent falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers. They are expected to uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. The trust and confidence clients repose in them require a high standard and appreciation of the latter’s duty to the former, the legal profession, the courts and the public. Indeed, the bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealings. To this end, lawyers should refrain from doing anything that might tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession.
In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.”
The Court explained in Buted v. Hernando:
“[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
“The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.” (Italics in the original)
In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the indirect contempt case and in the Complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 11204. Respondent should have evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the indirect contempt proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and should at all times weigh their actions, especially in their dealings with the latter and the public at large. They must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times.
The Court will not tolerate any departure from the “straight and narrow” path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession.
In Hilado v. David, which we quote below, the Court advised lawyers to be like Caesar’s wife – to be pure and to appear to be so.
“This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well as to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.”
Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than enhanced, the public perception of the legal profession. His divided loyalty constitutes malpractice for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
“SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – Any member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x x.”
x x x.
A survey of cases involving conflicting interests on the part of counsel reveals that the Court has imposed on erring attorneys either a reprimand, or a suspension from the practice of law from five (5) months to as high as two (2) years.
X x x.
See:
Marcelo v. Javier Sr., 214 SCRA 1, 12-13, September 18, 1992; Fernandez v. Grecia, 223 SCRA 425, 434, June 17, 1993. 203 SCRA 1, October 17, 1991. 84 Phil. 571, 578-579, September 21, 1949, per Tuason, J. See Nombrado v. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13, November 25, 1968; San Jose v. Cruz, 57 Phil. 792, February 4, 1933. Vda. De Alisbo v. Jalandoon Sr., 199 SCRA 321, July 31, 1991; Bautista v. Barrios, 9 SCRA 695, December 21, 1963; Natan v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640, July 23, 1952; Cantorne v. Ducosin, 57 Phil. 24, August 9, 1932.
2. In the case of BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, respondent. A. C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003, it was emphasized that “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts”. (Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility). THUS:
X x x.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
RULE 15.03. – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
X x x.
See:
Rule 15.06 – A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 199 [1999 ed.].
Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569 [1949]; Nombrado v. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13 [1968]; Bautista v. Barrios, 9 SCRA 695 [1963].
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, p. 199, citing Pierce v. Palmer, 31 R.I. 432.
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, supra, p. 220, citing In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258 [1914]; Grievance Committee v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A 2d 82 [1954] and Titania v. Ocampo, 200 SCRA 472 [1991].
Corporation Code, sec. 23.
3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Permanent Ed.) § 8044 (Importance of determining whether officer a trustee or agent).
Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82 (1911), cited in Gochan v. Young, G.R. No. 131889, 12 March 2001.
Asset Privatization Trust v. CA, 360 Phil. 768 (1998).
Harvard Law Review, Developments in the Law: Conflict of Interest, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1244, 1339-1342 (1981), cited in Solomon, Schwartz, Bauman & Weiss, Corporations: Law and Policy (3rd ed.) 1129 (1994).
Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corporation, 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affirmed in relevant part per curiam 532 F. 2d 1118 (7th Circ. 1978), citing Murphy v. Washington American League Baseball Club, Inc., 116 U.S. App. D.C. 362, 324 F. 2d 394 (1963).
Ong Ching v. Ramolete, 151-A Phil. 509, 514 [1973].
3. In the case of FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO vs. ATTY. NESTOR A. BAMBA, Adm. Case No. 6708, August 25, 2005, discussed the tests of conflicts of interest. THUS:
X x x.
The issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.
Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste.[8] In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[9] It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[10]
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.[11] Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyer’s conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client.[12] Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty.[13] Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.[14]
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.[15]
In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB he was still the counsel of record of the complainant in the pending ejectment case. We do not sustain respondent’s theory that since the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases fraught with different issues, parties, and subject matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
X x x.
In view of all of the foregoing, we find the respondent guilty of serious misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
X x x.
In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests a penalty ranging from one to three years’ suspension was imposed.[28] In this case, we find that a suspension from the practice of law for one year is warranted.
X x x.
Selected Notes:
[8] Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 579 (1949).
[9] Maturan v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 2597, 12 March 1998, 287 SCRA 443.
[10] Hilado v. David, supra note 8.
[11] Canon 6, par. 2, Canons of Professional Ethics.
[12] Hornilla v. Salunat, A.C. No. 5804, 1 July 2003, 405 SCRA 220; Northwestern University v. Arquillo, G.R. No. 6632, 2 August 2005.
[13] Tiania v. Ocampo, A.C. No. 2302, 12 August 1991, 200 SCRA 472, 479.
[14] Abaqueta v. Florido, A.C. No. 5948, 22 January 2003, 395 SCRA 569; Pormento v. Pontevedra, A.C. No. 5128, 31 March 2005.
[15] Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics 223 (6th ed. 1997), citing Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass’n v. Sanderson, 52 Tenn. App. 684; 378 SW2d 173 (1963); B.A. Op. 132 (15 March 1935).
[16] Maturan v. Gonzales, supra note 9; Artezuela v. Maderazo, 431 Phil. 135 (2002).
[17] Abaqueta v. Florido, A.C. No. 5948, 22 January 2003, 395 SCRA 569, 576.
[18] Rules 14.01 and 14.02, Canon 14, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[19] Rule 14.03 of Canon 14 and Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[23] Nakpil v. Valdes, 350 Phil. 412.
[27] Teodosio v. Nava, A.C. No. 4673, 27 April 2001, 357 SCRA 406.
[28] Vda. de Alisbo v. Jalandoni, A.C. No. 1311, 18 July 1991, 199 SCRA 321; PNB v. Cedo, A.C. No. 3701, 28 March 1995, 243 SCRA 1; Maturan v. Gonzales, supra note 9; Northwestern University, Inc. v. Arguillo, A.C. No. 6632, 2 August 2005.
4. In the case of LETICIA GONZALES vs. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, A.C. No. 6836, January 23, 2006, Rule 15. 03 was intended “to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.”
X x x,
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of Commissioner Reyes, respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative case filed by Gonzales against them. As respondent himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their counsel in the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them.[23]
With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.[24] Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[25] Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[26]
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.[27] As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs. Bamba,[28]
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.[29]
The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow.[30]
Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies.
As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:[31]
…[W]e… cannot sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondent’s conduct as dishonest,
corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, “into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice.”[32]
The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative.[33]
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances where lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one.[34] Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses’ case other than him, still he should have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then seek the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts.[35] These respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.
X x x.
In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests a penalty ranging from one to three years’ suspension was imposed.[38]
X x x.
See:
[1] Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
[2] Rule 13.01 – A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
[3] Rule 15.02 – A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
[4] Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
[5] Rule 21.01 – A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b) When required by law;
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.
[6] Rule 21.02 – A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
[24] See Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[25] Quiambao vs. Bamba, A.C. No. 6708 (CBD Case No. 01-874), August 25, 2005.
[27] Santos, Sr. vs. Beltran, A.C. No. 5858, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 17, 25-26.
[28] A.C. No. 6708 (CBD Case No. 01-874), August 25, 2005.
[31] 84 Phil. 569 (1949).
[33] Quiambao vs. Bamba, supra.
[35] See Rules 15.01 & 15.03, CPR.
[36] Mercado vs. Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1, 8; Rangwani vs. Diño, 443 SCRA 408, 417.
[37] Rangwani vs. Diño, supra.
