In an appealed probate case, I raised the novel idea of secured substituted compliance to comply with a final and executory interlocutory order of the lower court. The appeals court rejected my stand. Nonetheless, the discussions therein might be useful to the readers. The basic parts of the petition for certiorari are extensively quoted below.
X x x.
I. THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT; AND THE RELEVANT ULTIMATE FACTS
On January 16, 1998, the private respondent BENJAMIN M. OMAMBAC, a brother of the petitioner, filed a petition for appointment as a special administrator of the estate of their deceased mother, VICTORIA M. OMAMBAC, and for the issuance of letters of administration to settle the estate. It was docketed as SP. PROC. No. 98-0004 and raffled to Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City. (Annexes “C” to “C-4”).
On June 1, 1998, the private respondent filed a MOTION seeking an order commanding the petitioner to deposit the rentals being collected by the petitioner from the lessees of a part of the building that the petitioner had built on the land which formed part of the estate of their deceased mother. (Annexes “D” to “D-3”).
On June 17, 1998, the petitioner filed with the trial court an OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION. (Annexes “E” to “E-7).
On June 23, 1998, the petitioner filed with the trial court an OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION TO DEPOSIT RENTALS. (Annexes “F” to “F-8”, with the Affidavit of the petitioner, dated June 29,k 1998, attached thereto).
On August 12, 1998, the petitioner filed a MOTION TO ADMIT AFFIDAVITS OF WITNESSES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DEPOSIT RENTALS. (Annexes “G” to “G-11”, with the affidavits of the following heirs attached thereto, i.e., REVELINO OMAMBAC SALVADOR, EXEQUIEL OMAMBAC LARA, ANDY OMAMBAC OLIVER, MARIANITO OMAMBAC, DELOGORIA OMAMBAC CAINTIC, and LUCINDA OMAMBAC GREGORIO attached thereto).
On October 16, 1998, the petitioner filed a MOTION TO ADMIT ADDITONAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DEPOSIT RENTALS. (Annexes “H” to “H-6”, with the affidavit of MAXIMA MARTIN and JUANITA MARTIN).
All of the foregoing motions and pleadings were opposed by the private respondent.
On February 14, 2000 the trial court, then under the headship of the Hon. Presiding Judge JOSE F. CAOIBES JR., issued a RESOLUTION, resolving the pending incidents, thus: (a) ordering the petitioner to deposit the rentals in the names of the heirs and to submit an accounting thereof form June 1, 1998; and (b) ordering the petitioner to demolish the right-of-way structure on the ground floor of the building that the petitioner had built on the estate, subject to the duty to the private respondent to post an indemnity bond of P200,000.00 to answer for the damages that might be sustained by the petitioner if the demolition should be found later to be improper. (Annexes “I” to “I-1”).
On March 17, 2000, the petitioner filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of the said Order, dated February 14, 2000. (See Annexes “J” to “J-16”, with the attached joint affidavit of JUANITA MARTIN LUCENA and EXEQUIEL OMAMBAC LARA in support thereof).
The private respondent opposed the Motion. On May 4, 2000, the petitioner filed a REPLY TO THE OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. (Annexes “K” to “K-10”).
On July 27, 2000, the trial court, thru its Former Presiding Judge, Hon. Caoibes Jr., issued a RESOLUTION denying the motion for reconsideration. (Annex “L”).
The petitioner questioned before the Court of Appeals, by way of Certiorari (Rule 65), the said Orders of Hon. Caoibes Jr., docketed as CA GR SP No. 61147.
On July 16, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a DECISION modifying the two Resolutions of the Hon. Caoibes Jr., viz.: (a) affirming the order requiring the petitioner to deposit the rentals; and (b) nullifying the order which required the petitioner to demolish the right-of-way structure on the ground floor of the building that he had built on the estate. (Annexes “M” to “M-10”).
The petitioner appealed by certiorari (Rule 45) the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court in GR No. 159197. In a minute resolution, dated September 17, 2003, the Supreme Court denied the petition for review. The denial became final and executory on February 18, 2004. (Annex “N”). In a MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION, dated April 5, 2004, the private respondent sought the issuance by the trial court --- this time under the headship of the Acting Presiding Judge, Hon. Elizabeth Yu-Guray (public respondent) -- of a writ of execution to enforce the Resolution of the Former Presiding Judge, Hon. Caoibes Jr., dated February 14, 2000. (Annexes “O” to “O-2”).
On April 14, 2004, the petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion, entitled:
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
1. FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO POST INDEMNITY BOND OR PERFORMANCE BOND BY WAY OF “SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE” WITH THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2000;
2. FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FORMALLY PRESENT TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSED “SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE” WITH THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2000;
3. TO COMPEL THE OTHER CONCERNED LEGAL HEIRS WHO ARE LIKEWISE GENERATING RENTALS/PROFITS FROM THE SUBJECT LAND AND THE STRUCTURES THEREON TO SIMILARLY ACCOUNT FOR SUCH RENTAL AND PROFITS AND TO EITHER DEPOSIT THE SAME IN A BANK IN THE NAME OF ALL THE HEIRS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO POST INDEMNITY BONDS OR PERFORMANCE BONDS BY WAY OF “SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE” WITH THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2000
4. TO CREATE AND APPOINT A THREE-MAN PANEL OF COMMISSIONERS, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE HEIRS, TO VERIFY AND REPORT TO THE COURT ON THE FINANCIAL HISTORY AND COMPUTATION OF THE QUESTIONED RENTALS/PROFITS FOR PURPOSES OF THE PROPOSED “SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE” BY ALL THE HEIRS CONCERNED WITH HE ORDER DATED FEBRUAR 14, 2000
(See Annexes “P” to “P-13”).
The petitioner manifested in his omnibus motion that it may be partly treated as his opposition to the private respondent’s motion for issuance of a writ of execution.
The omnibus motion of the petitioner sought the following reliefs, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the interest of justice and fairness, and for the sake of the very survival, existence, sustenance, support, education, and physical and psychological wholeness and well-being of the family and dependents of the herein oppositor-movant, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. The herein oppositor-movant be granted leave/permission of court to post an INDEMNITY BOND or a PERFORMANCE BOND by way of SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE with the Order, dated Feb. 14, 2000;\
2. The herein oppositor-movant be granted leave/permission of court to present testimonial and documentary evidence to prove and justify the instant omnibus motion;
3. The other concerned heirs be ordered to likewise either deposit the rentals that they collect our of the questioned structure built on the subject estate (land) or to post indemnity bonds or performance bonds by way of secured substituted compliance therewith and to render an accounting of such rental that they collect therefrom; and
4. A panel of commissioners be created and appointed in the manner proposed/discussed in Part V of this omnibus motion, supra, to VERIFY AND REPORT TO THE COURT ON THE FINANCIAL HISTORY AND COMPUTATION OF THE QUESTIONED RENTALS/PROFITS (a) due from the herein oppositor-movant (July 1, 1998 up to the present, as stated in the Order, dated Feb.
14, 200) and (b) due from the other concerned heirs mentioned above for purposes of the proposed SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE discussed in this omnibus motion, supra.
FURTHER, the herein oppositor-movant prays for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.”
The private respondent opposed the omnibus motion.
On May 5, 2004, the petitioner filed a REPLY (TO: PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION, DATED APRIL 23, 2004). (Annexes “Q” to “Q-9”, with the attached joint affidavit of the heirs REMEDIO OMAMBAC SKALAK, LUCINDA OMAMBAC GREGORIO, ADELAIDA OMAMBAC CAINTIC, AURORA OMAMBAC, ANDY OMAMBAC OLIVER, and JOEL OMAMBAC ACDA in support of thereof).
The Reply of the petitioner reiterated the following reliefs, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the interest of justice and fairness, and for the sake of the very survival, existence, sustenance, support, education, and physical and psychological wholeness and well-being of the family and dependents of the herein oppositor-movant, it is respectfully prayed that:
5. The herein oppositor-movant be granted leave/permission of court to post an INDEMNITY BOND or a PERFORMANCE BOND by way of SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE with the Order, dated Feb. 14, 2000;\
6. The herein oppositor-movant be granted leave/permission of court to present testimonial and documentary evidence to prove and justify the instant omnibus motion;
7. The other concerned heirs be ordered to likewise either deposit the rentals that they collect our of the questioned structure built on the subject estate (land) or to post indemnity bonds or performance bonds by way of secured substituted compliance therewith and to render an accounting of such rental that they collect therefrom; and
8. A panel of commissioners be created and appointed in the manner proposed/discussed in Part V of this omnibus motion, supra, to VERIFY AND REPORT TO THE COURT ON THE
FINANCIAL HISTORY AND COMPUTATION OF THE QUESTIONED RENTALS/PROFITS (a) due from the herein oppositor-movant (July 1, 1998 up to the present, as stated in the Order, dated Feb. 14, 200) and (b) due from the other concerned heirs mentioned above for purposes of the proposed SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE discussed in this omnibus motion, supra.
FURTHER, the herein oppositor-movant prays for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.”
On April 29, 29, 2004, the petitioner caused the taking of the deposition of the heir (older sister) REMEDIOS OMAMBAC SKALAK, a resident of Australia who was then vacationing in the Philippines, in support of his pending omnibus motion. (Annexes “R” to “R-28”).
In an EX PARTE MANIFESTATION filed on May 27, 2004 the petitioner adopted the deposition of Remedios Omambac Skalak to form part of his evidence in support of (a) his pending omnibus motion, (b) his opposition to the private respondent’s motion for issuance of writ of execution, and (c) his main opposition to the main case. (Annexes “S” to “S-3”).
On August 30, 2004 the petitioner received a copy of the questioned ORDER of the public respondent, dated August 16, 2004, granting the private respondent’s motion for issuance of writ of execution. (Annexes “T” to “T-1”; also marked, supra, as Annexes “B” to B-1”).
On August 31, 2004, the petitioner filed an URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (RE: ORDER, DATED AUGUST 16, 2004). (See Annexes “U” to “U-13”). It sought the following reliefs, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the ORDER, dated August 16, 2004, be RECONISDERED and its implementation (i.e., issuance of the writ of execution to enforce the Order, dated February 14, 2000) DEFERRED until after the full consideration by the Court of the aforementioned pleadings/motions of the herein movant OMAMBAC, which are fundamentally and indispensably related to and intertwined with the issue/s subject matter of the recent ORDER, dated August 16, 2004, to wit:
a) URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, dated April 13, 2004, and filed in Court on April 14, 2004;
b) EX PARTE MANIFESTATION, dated May 26, 2004, and filed in Court on May 27, 2004;
c) The DEPOSITION of REMEDIOS OMAMBAC SKALAK (heir) dated April 29,2 004, which had been adopted by the herein movant as part of his testimonial evidence to prove his aforementioned URGENT OMNIBUS MOITON;
d) The REPLY of the herein movant OMAMBAC, dated May 4, 2004, and filed in Court on May 5, 2004.
FURTHER, the herein movant OMAMBAC urgently prays for leave of Court to post a surety bond by way of SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE with the Order, dated February 14, 2000.
FINALLY, the herein movant prays for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.”
The private respondent opposed the same. On September 20, 2004, the petitioner filed a REPLY thereto. (Annexes “V” to “V-3”).
On November 16, 2004, the petitioner received a copy of the second questioned Order of the public respondent, dated November 9, 2004, denying the petitioner’s URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. (See Annexes “W” to “W-1”, also marked, supra, as Annexes “A” to “A-1”).
Hence, this petition.
II. ISSUES
With all due respect to the public respondent, whom the undersigned counsel for the petitioner holds in high regards, the petitioner humbly submits that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction resulting (a) in a grave miscarriage of justice, (b) in the causation of the physical and mental extinction, debilitation, hunger, disease and
ignorance of the petitioner and his family and dependents, (c) in a serious disregard of a jurist’s duty to administer compassionate, merciful and pragmatic justice and equity and to be guided by judicial conscience, and (d) in the grave violation of the constitutional and human rights of the petitioner to due process of law, equal protection of the law, and access to the justice system, viz.:
· BY REJECTING THE GOOD-FAITH PROPOSAL/.MOTION OF THE PETITIONER TO BE ALLOWED TO POST A PERFORMANCE BOND OR INDEMNITY BOND OR SUPERSEDEAS BOND, BY WAY OF “SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE” WITH THE RESOLUTION, DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2004, OF THE FOREMER PRESIDING JUDGE, HON. JOSE F. CAOIBES JR., AS MODIFIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO DEPOSIT THE RENTALS HE COLLECTS FROM THE LESSEES OF THE BUILDING THAT HE HAD BUILT ON THE ESTATE OF HIS DECEASE MOTHER. THUS, VIOLATING THE COMPASSIONATE, MERCIFUL AND PRAGMATIC SPIRIT OF RULES ON EXECUTION AND THE RULES OF SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS;
· BY REFUSING TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO FORMALLY PRESENT TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION AND, MORE PARTICULARLY, IN SUPPORT OF HIS GOOD-FAITH PROPOSAL TO BE ALLOWED TO POST A PERFORMANCE BOND OR INDEMNITY BOND OR SUPERSEADEAS BOND BY WAY OF SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE FORMER PRESIDING JDUGE, HON. CAOIBES JR., DATED February 14, 2000, THUS VIOLATING HIS BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, AND ACCESS TO THE COURTS;
· BY REFUSING TO COMPEL THE OTHER HEIRS WHO ARE LIKEWISE GENERATING RENTALS FROM THE SUBJECT ESTATE TO SIMILARLY ACCOUNT FOR SUCH RENTALS AND TO EITHER DEPOSIT THE SAME, PENDENTE LITE, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO POST A PERFORMANCE BOND OR INDEMNITY BOND OR SUEPRSEDEAS BOND IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE TRIAL COURT, DATED FEBRAURY 14, 2000, THUS, FOSTERING SERIOUS DISCRIMINATION, INEQUITY, AND UNFAIRNESS IN THE TREATMENT OF THE HEIRS.
· BY REFUSING TO CREATE A THREE-MAN PANEL OF COMMISSIONERS, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE HEIRS, TO VERIFY AND REPORT TO THE COURT ON THE FINANCIAL HISTORY AND COMPUTATION OF THE RENTALS THAT ALL THE HEIRS ARE COLLECTING FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE IMPROVEMENTS/SPACES ON THE SUBJECT ESTATE, FOR PURPOSES OF ACCURATELY DETERMINING HOW MUCH EACH OF THE LESSOR-HEIRS SHOULD DEPOSIT OR ACCOUNT FOR OR HOW MUCH BOND EACH OF SUCH LESSOR-HEIRS SHOULD POST, TO COMPLY WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE TRIAL COURT, DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2000, THUS, VIOLATING THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, AND ACCESS TO COURT AND, FURTHER, THUS, FOSTERING DISCRIMINATION, UNFAIRNESS AND INEQUITY IN THE MANNER OF TREATING SUCH LESSOR-HEIRS WHO ARE SIMILARLY SITUATED.
III. DISCUSSION
A. PERFORMANCE BOND OR INDEMNITY BOND OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND BY WAY OF SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION, DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2000.
It will be noted that the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR SP No. 61147, dated July 16, 2003, MODFIED the Resolution of the trial court, dated Feb. 14, 2000, thus:
(a) by AFFIRMING that portion of the Resolution of this Honorable Court, dated Feb.1 4, 200, that required the herein oppositor-movant to DEPOSIT the questioned rentals being claimed by his brother – petitioner Mr. Benjamin M. Omambac; and
(b) by NULLIFYING AND SETTING ASIDE that portion of the said Resolution of this Honorable Court, dated Feb. 14, 2000, that stopped the petitioner Mr. Rodolfo M. Omambac from putting up a structure obstructing the alleged right of way.
It is conceded that, under prevailing Philippine jurisprudence, e.g. Intestate Estate of the Late Don Marinao San Pedro v. CA, GR 103727, Engracio San Pedro, et. al. v. CA, et. al., GR 106496, Dec. 18, 1996, the probate court may provisionally resolve issues of titles and ownerships for purposes of a prima facie determination of the inventory of the estate under its current consideration.
The Order dated February 14, 2000 is premised on the valid desire of the Honorable Court, as a fair arbitrator and dispenser of justice, to INSURE AND PROTECT THE PROVISIONAL SAFETY, pendente lite, of the questioned rentals while the trial court is still in the arduous and painstaking judicial process of accurately determining the true, correct and final financial and physical inventory of the subject estate.
For the above purpose, the Court has ordered the petitioner to DEPOSIT the rentals he collects from the building he had built on the estate during the pendency of the main case in the name of the surviving heirs and to make an accounting of the rentals from the time the motion to deposit was filed on June 1, 1998, as part of the interim and provisional judicial process of determining the true, correct and final inventory of the subject estate.
Further, the Court, in its said Order, clearly stated that if, after trial, it finds the claims of the petitioner Mr. Benjamin M. Omambac to be bereft of merit, “…the deposited amount shall inure solely to the benefit of the oppositor (Mr. Rodolfo M. Omambac) together with all the renal proceeds collected…”.
The urgent omnibus motion of the petitioner invoking the compassionate, merciful and pragmatic judicial conscience of the trial court a quo and seeking, inter alia, the permission of the public respondent to allow the petitioner to post a performance bond or indemnity bond or supersedeas bond in an amount equivalent to the proven value of the rentals, counted from July 1, 1998, by way of SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE with the Order, dated February 14, 2000, fully and completely meets and satisfies the valid desire of the Court to insure, protect and preserve the SAFETY of the questioned rentals.
The petitioner, in his urgent omnibus motion, alleged (and was willing to prove thru testimonial and documentary evidence) that the very physical and psychological survival, existence, livelihood, sustenance, necessities, education and other basic human needs of the whole family of the petitioner depended on the rentals that he collects from his lessees who occupy the building that he had built on the subject estate since 1993 out of his own funds and saving; that the petitioner was collecting P35,000.00 monthly from his two (2) lessees, namely: (a) Ochoa Pawnshop, P8,000.00/month and (b) Villarica Pawnshop, P25,000.00/month; that total monthly family expenses incurred by the petitioner to adequately sustain, support, feed, educate, medicate/treat, and maintain the physical and psychological wholeness and well-being of his family and dependents, including an older brother who had suffered s stroke, amount to approximately P35,000.00 a month, just barely making it to the break-even point vis-Ã -vis the total amount the aforesaid monthly rentals, to wit: x x x.
The petitioner, in his aforesaid urgent omnibus motion, manifested his readiness to post a performance bond or indemnity bond or supersedeas bond at such proven sum equivalent the value of the questioned rentals as a sing of his sincerity and good-faith and by way of SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE with the Resolution dated February 14, 2000. He manifested in the same motion his readiness to make an accounting of the questioned rentals, subject, of course, to the fair-lay and due-process rule of an opportunity to present evidence to show the trial court the correct financial history and computation thereof and subject to his proposal to the trial court for the creation of a three-man panel of commissioners that will verify and study such financial history and which shall report the results of such audit or study to the trial court for appropriate action.
X x x.
B. THE PETITIONER HAS NO INTENTION TO DELAY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION, DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2000; IN FACT, HE HAS OFFERED IN GOOD FAITH TO THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO BE ALLOWED COMPLY WITH THE RESOLUTION, DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2000, IN A MANNER THAT IS BOTH A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE THEREWITH AND IN A MANNER THAT IS DULY PROTECTIVE OF THE INTERESTS OF THE ESTATE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
The petitioner has no intention whatsoever in delaying the implementation of the Resolution, dated Feb. 14, 2000. In exercising his statutorily allowed remedial/procedural right, under Rule 65 and under the due process clause/mandate of the Constitution, to elevate, on certiorari, to the Court of Appeals the subject Resolution, the petitioner had acted in good faith and was motivated by the purest of intention to seek an appellate review of the legal questions arising out of the said Resolution, in the interest of substantive and procedural justice and in the interest of jurisprudential clarification.
He has likewise acted in good faith in filing with the trial court his urgent omnibus motion, seeking the kind, compassionate, humane and understanding leave and permission of the public respondent to allow him to post a performance bond or indemnity bond or supersedeas bond by way of SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE with the said Resolution.
As explained in the urgent omnibus motion of the petitioner, his intent was precisely to respect and comply with the spirit and substance of the said Resolution, after the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have spoken, in such a manner that is just, humane, compassionate and considerate…that is, in a manner that would not lead to the ultimate physical and psychological extinction, hunger, and displacement of his family and dependents.
The urgent omnibus motion of the petitioner which sought, inter alia, the leave of the public respondent to allow him to post the aforesaid bond was not intended to amend or change (and will not amend or change) the tenor, letter and spirit the Resolution, dated Feb. 14, 2000.
If his motion to post such a bond were granted, the true spirit and substance of the Resolution would be maintained and respected. In fact, an indemnity bond or performance bond, issued by a Court-accredited insurer, is a valid, legal and universally acceptable way of complying with court orders and of protecting the integrity of court processes.
For instance, under Rule 57 and Rule 58, a COUNTERBOND is allowed by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to suspend the physical implementation of a writ of preliminary attachment or a writ of preliminary injunction, if the damage to be caused to the party subject to such writ would be much greater and irreparable compared to that of the party who had successfully procured such writ. The same rule applies with respect to a writ of replevin. In the instances described above, the interests and claims of the adverse parties are amply and well protected, pendente lite, by the bond.
The prevailing doctrine of supervening facts, under existing jurisprudence, allows the stay of a writ of execution and gives the Court the judicial discretion to amend the manner of the implementation of such writ -- more so, where the party against whom such writ has been issued is prepared, in good faith, to post an acceptable bond to protect the claim of the adverse party and the integrity of the Court.
To subject the petitioner to a judicial encumbrance (i.e., to deposit and account for rentals), while freeing and exempting the other heirs, who similarly
The finality of the subject resolution, dated Feb. 14, 2000 is not the issue. The issue is the humane and just way of implementing the same. The petitioner in good faith invoked the residual jurisdiction and judicial discretion of the trial court by seeking its kind, compassionate and understanding leave and permission to be allowed to post a performance bond or indemnity bond or supersedeas bond by way of SECURED SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE with the Resolution, dated February 14, 2000.
C. RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE
In the fairly recent case of PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER and LIGHT CO., INC., respondent. G.R. No. 127371. April 25, 2002, citing the case of Bachrach Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 487, 495 (1998), the Supreme Court held, thus:
“The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief.”
Although the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory “judgment”, or quash it, or order its stay (Amor vs. Jugo, 77 Phil. 703) because the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment is a ministerial duty of the court compellable by mandamus, (Ebero vs. Cañizares, 79 Phil. 152) it may do so in the following instances: (a) When there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes execution inequitable; (Warner, Barners & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4; Lee vs. Mapa; 51 Phil. 624; cited in R. J. FRANCISCO PLEADINGS AND TRIAL PRACTICE, Volume II, 1996, Page 851).
In the case of ROSA PASCUAL, GREGORIO CRUZ, and JOAQUIN SERIBAN, petitioners, vs. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Rizal City Branch, BERNARDICA LUCAS, and AMBROSIO J. GUTIERREZ, respondents. G.R. No. L-2802. December 23, 1949, it was held that a court, or the judge thereof, has a power temporarily to stay execution of its judgment whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice. The mere pendency of another court proceeding is not necessarily a ground for a stay. However, an execution will ordinarily be stayed pending the termination of other proceedings of relief from an execution refers to facts occurring subsequent to the judgment. A court, or the judge thereof, has the power temporarily to stay execution of its judgment whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice. (33 C. J. S., 312.) The mere pendency of another court proceeding is not necessarily a ground for a stay. However, an execution will ordinarily be stayed pending the termination of other proceedings connected with the principal case. (Id., 314.) Other ground of relief from an execution refers to facts occurring subsequent to the judgment. (Chua A. H. Lee vs. Mapa, 51 Phil., 624.)
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Carson in the case of THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. 9959. February 9, 1917, he stated, thus:
“The following paragraph from Freeman on Executions, together with the citations of authority in support of the pertinent comment in the original, sets forth the doctrine which in my opinion should be applied under the very exceptional circumstances of this case:
"Stay of execution other than by appellate proceedings. — During the time within which plaintiff is otherwise entitled to execution his right thereto maybe suspended or destroyed by what is commonly known as a stay of execution, granted by the court in which the judgment was rendered or by some other court of superior authority, or arising without any formal order of any court as a result of proceedings authorized by statute. X x x. Each court has such general control of its process as enables it to act for the prevention of all abuse thereof. Hence it may, to prevent the annoyance which might be occasioned by the attempted execution of a void judgment, either stay by the attempted execution of a void judgment, either stay or arrest the process; and may, where it is clear that the judgment ought not to be further enforced, order a perpetual stay of execution. If it appears that the proceedings have been instituted which may result in the annulment of the judgment or in granting the defendant a release therefrom, its further execution maybe suspended until the result of such proceedings can be known. Xxxx. A perpetual stay of execution may be granted by the court in which the judgment was rendered, when such judgment was void when entered, or when, from some cause occurring after its entry, it is clear that the further prosecution thereof ought not to be allowed. Xxxx.
"The power of court to temporarily stay the issuing of execution is exercised in an almost infinite variety of circumstances, in order that the ends of justice may be accomplished. In many cases, this power operates almost as a substitute for proceedings in equity, and enables the defendant to prevent any inequitable use of the judgment or writ. xxxx. The power, however, to grant such stays of execution is everywhere conceded, and it could not be limited by the enactment of any unvarying rule without encountering evils of greater magnitude than those sought to be suppressed. xxxx. "
The su bject Resolution, dated February 14, 2000, was not a final judgment or a final order but an interlocutory order. As regard an interlocutory order, it does not become final and executory in the sense that it is not a judgment or a decision or a final order; and therefore, there is nothing in the Rules of Court that prevents the public respondent from modifying the said Resolution in such a way as to enable and allow the petitioner to post a performance bond or indemnity bond or supersedeas bond by way of SECURED SUSBTITUED COMPLIANCE therewith.
In the recent case of RODOLFO DE LEON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ESTELITA and AVELINO BATUNGBACAL, respondents. G.R. No. 138884. June 6, 2002, the Supreme Court held, thus:
“A final order is that which gives an end to the litigation.[1] When the order or judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits, it is merely interlocutory.[2] Quite obviously, the partial judgment ordering Estelita to pay petitioner is an interlocutory order because it leaves other things for the trial court to do and does not decide with finality the rights and obligations of the parties. Specifically, at the time the partial judgment was rendered, there remained other issues including whether the husband Avelino had any liability under Article 121 of the Family Code. However, as the partial judgment disposed of one of the issues involved in the case, it is to be taken in conjunction with the decision dated June 2, 1997. Together, these two issuances form one integrated decision.” (Investments, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-60036, 147 SCRA 334, 340 (1987), citing PLDT Employees' Union vs. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-8138, 97 Phil. 424, 426 (1955)).”
An interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. This prescinds from a court's inherent power to control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. It is immaterial that the judge who exercises such powers is different from the one who issued the rescinded or amended order since the former is not legally prevented from revoking the interlocutory order of another judge in the very litigation subsequently assigned to him for judicial action. The only limitation is that the judge can not act with grave abuse of discretion, or that no injustice results thereby. (LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SPOUSES MANUEL T. LEY AND JANET T. LEY, petitioners, vs. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No. 133801, June 27, 2000).
It must be stressed that the very support, sustenance and existence of the family of the petitioner, and the education and support of his wife and child, as
well as of the older brother under his case who is a stroke victim, depend on the rentals he collects out of the building that he had built on the subject estate. Under Rule 39, in relation to the relevant provisions on support of the Family Code, support is of primordial importance to a family. We may apply, by analogy, the spirit of the holding of the Supreme Court in the recent case of AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO C. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 61, Baguio City, ALBERT G. TOLENTINO, in his capacity as RTC Sheriff of Baguio City, and FRANCHESKA JOY C. PONDEVIDA, assisted by BERNADETTE C. PONDEVIDA, respondents. G.R. No. 145527. May 28, 2002, thus:
“In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v. Soriano[i] is relevant, thus:
The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enroll in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when needed. (95 Phil. 806 (1954)).”
The analogical spirit of the case of PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND FERTIPHIL CORPORATION, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 106052. October 22, 1999, may be applicable in the instant petition, insofar as it suggests that the appellate court has the discretion to determine what is “good reason” to either grant or deny execution pending appeal, viz.:
The prevailing doctrine then — which is the same as provided in paragraph 2, Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — is that discretionary execution is permissible when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the time to appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may after the lapse of time become unable to enjoy it.
X x x. Although ascertainment of the special reasons for execution pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the appellate Court should not normally disturb such finding, intervention by the appellate court may be proper, if it is shown that there has been an abuse of discretion. That the appeal was merely dilatory because the assailed letter of instruction is unconstitutional, does not constitute "good reason" to justify execution pending appeal. Well-settled is the rule that it is not for the trial court to determine the merit of a decision it rendered as this is the role of the appellate Court. Hence, it is not within the competence of the trial court, in resolving the motion for execution pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as the basis for finding good reason to grant the motion.
X x x. The rule on execution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to the general rule. Applying the rule on statutory construction, it should be interpreted only so far as the language thereof fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general rule rather than the exceptions. In light of the foregoing, this Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner admitted the correctness of the special or discretionary execution when it posted the supersedeas bond. Besides, in its "Urgent Omnibus Motion" before the trial court, petitioner prayed that the Order of the lower court dated April 8, 1992, directing execution pending appeal, be set aside.
Then too, it can be-gleaned that there is no good reason to grant execution pending appeal, under the premises. To repeat, the ground for granting execution pending appeal must be a good reason. Thus, when the Court has already granted a stay of execution upon the adverse party's filing of a supersedeas bond, the circumstances justifying execution despite the supersedeas bond, must be paramount; they should outweigh the security offered by the supersedeas bond. In the present case, however, the Court discerns no reason paramount enough to warrant the execution pending appeal. To rule otherwise would be to make the remedy of execution pending appeal a tool of oppression and inequity instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice.”
X x x.
[1] Investments, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-60036, 147 SCRA 334, 340 (1987), citing PLDT Employees' Union vs. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-8138, 97 Phil. 424, 426 (1955).
[2] PLDT Employees' Union vs. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers' Union, id. at 426-427.
[i] 95 Phil. 806 (1954).
X x x.
This is the related 2003 earlier decision of the Court of Appeals in the above case.
OMAMBAC v. CAOIBES, et. al., CA-G.R. SP NO. 61147, July 16, 2003
xxxxx.
For The Purpose of Determining Whether A Certain Property Should Or Should Not Be Included In The Estate Of The Decedent The Probate Court May Pass Upon The Issue Of Ownership But Such Determination Is Merely Provisional And Is Subject To The Final Decision In A Separate Action
In a litany of cases, the Supreme Court delineated the boundary by which a Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court may extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of ownership. In Pastor, Jr. vs Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court stated:
“As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate court may pass upon title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.”[i]
This rule was subsequently reiterated in Pereira vs. Court of Appeals, to wit:
“The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly with competence of the probate court. However, the court’s determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.”[i]
Again, in Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court elucidated:
“Nevertheless, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings, but such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title.”[i]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, it is plain that the trial court correctly granted private respondent’s motion to deposit rentals from the commercial building. It was well within its competence to determine, albeit provisionally, whether the commercial building and its rental income should be included in the estate of the decedent. Having ruled in the affirmative, it is but proper for the trial court to order the petitioner to account for the rental proceeds of the building and to deposit the same in a bank for safekeeping, subject to the final determination of the probate proceeding.
Petitioner, however, argues that private respondent cannot collaterally attack his ownership over the commercial building by the mere expedient of filing a motion to deposit rentals and urgent motion to demolish structure with the probate court. Instead, he says, an independent action should be instituted questioning his title over the commercial building.
We are not convinced. Foremost, there is no presumption that the petitioner is the owner of the commercial building. On the contrary, it is disputably presumed that the building is owned by the estate of Victoria Omambac, as a registered owner of the parcel of land on which it is built. This accords with Article 440 of the New Civil Code, which provides that –
“The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.”[i]
The parcel of land was registered in the name of the deceased Victoria Omambac as early as December 16, 1993.[i] In contrast, petitioner declared the building only in 1996. Clearly, as between petitioner and the estate of Victoria Omambac, the latter is presumed to be the owner of the commercial building. Thus, for the purpose of provisional inclusion of the commercial building and its rentals in the estate of the decedent, the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion.
A Probate Court, Being A Court Of Limited Jurisdiction, Has No Competence To Rule On Private Respondent’s Right-Of-Way
Anent private respondent’s motion, we find that the trial court, acting as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue of private respondent’s right-of-way.
A probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction.[i] It can only adjudicate on matters relating to the settlement of estates, the probate of wills, including the appointment and removal of administrators and executors[i] and to all matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased[i]. Concomitantly, it has no competence to resolve matters which have no logical connection with the settlement of the estate of the deceased person.
Here, the private respondent’s motion is not in any way connected or related to the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Nor to any incidental or collateral matters connected with it. The second motion seeks to prohibit petitioner from putting up a structure purportedly obstructing private petitioner’s right-of-way.[i] Indubitably, the probate court has no power, much less competence, to rule on the said motion which has no logical relation or connection with the settlement of the estate. Neither is the resolution of the alleged right-of way within the incidental or collateral powers of the probate court. Such powers must necessarily relate to or at least have a logical connection with the settlement of the estate of the decedent. It is obvious from the foregoing that public respondent had no jurisdiction to rule on private respondent’s second motion. That matter ought to be litigated in a separate action before another court of competent jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The trial court order granting the motion to deposit rental is AFFIRMED while the order granting the motion to stop petitioner from putting up a structure obstructing the right-of-way is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
