In his Report and Recommendation[9] of August 13, 2009, Judge Estacio found that the respondent’s act of demanding and receiving money from a party litigant constituted grave misconduct in office - a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service pursuant to Section 23, Rule IX of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, and other pertinent Civil Service Laws. Judge Estacio recommended the respondent’s dismissal from the service with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, and forfeiture of all his benefits, except accrued leave credits.
The OCA, in its Report of P40,000.00, with forfeiture of all the retirement benefits he is entitled to except accrued leave credits, if any, and that he be barred from re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
The Court’s Ruling
As a preliminary matter, we note the unusual twists this case took, as the respondent was initially only a witness in another case – the investigation of Judge Dela Pena – where he had an active role and where he made incriminatory admissions that led, after investigation, to the docketing of a separate administrative case against him. At or about the time Judge Dela Peña was being investigated (in which investigation respondent Carbon III submitted his affidavit), the respondent stopped reporting to his office and subsequently submitted a resignation letter that the Court did not approve for lack of the required clearance. An unusual twist came when the Court, instead of directly disapproving his resignation letter and relating his resignation to the investigation in the case of Judge Dela Peña, simply dropped him from the rolls and considered him separated from the service.
To be sure, the OCA’s recommendation and the subsequent Court action were unfortunate, but this lapse notwithstanding, we hold that, under the unique circumstances of this administrative matter, the respondent’s absence without leave and dropping from the rolls did not place him outside our reach as he apparently intended; he cannot use his disappearance as a shield against liability for his actions while he was in office. We can likewise continue with the case against him as this case was brought while he was still an active employee of the Court.
After he has been heard through his affidavit and after giving him the opportunity to explain himself and to put up his defenses, he cannot now hide under the claim of denial of due process. Joie was clear in his complaint regarding the illegality complained about – bribery allegedly perpetrated by Judge Dela Peña through the respondent. Thus, it was a complaint, no less, against the respondent to which he responded with an admission that he indeed “followed up” the case and secured sums from Joie under the representation that these were to be given to Judge Dela Peña. In the ensuing formal investigation, the respondent failed to appear despite notice. Instead, he conveniently dropped out of sight. It was under these facts that we maintain our continuing jurisdiction to hold the respondent administratively liable as a court employee for an illegality committed while in the service.
On the merits, we agree with the OCA’s finding that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct as charged. He admitted in his affidavit that he followed up Natasha Dioquino’s case with Judge Dela Peña and that he handed over to the latter, on two occasions, sums of money from Joie. While the case against Judge Dela Peña did not prosper for lack of evidence that he indeed demanded and received money in return for a favorable ruling on Natasha Dioquino’s case, what remains uncontested is that money changed hands between Joie and the respondent on the understanding that these sums would be a consideration for receiving a favorable judgment on a case that the respondent “worked on.” In plainer terms, what remained proven was a case-fixing activity where the respondent was a direct participant as the middleman and fixer between the decision maker and the litigant. Under these circumstances, that Judge Dela Peña might not have been a party to the nefarious arrangement is immaterial as what remained was the respondent’s demand for a bribe that implicated a judge, in fact a colleague of his own father in the Judiciary.
Thus viewed, the respondent’s flawed character and unfitness for a position in the Judiciary stand out, aggravated by his shallow scheme to escape liability by dropping out of sight to render him out of the reach of our processes. As we held in the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr.,[14] separation from the service renders a former employee out of the reach of the government’s administrative processes with respect to the former employment, but this claim does not hold true if the separation from the service was in contemplation of and to escape administrative liability from an offense that took place and was investigated while the employee was still in the service.[15]
Under Section 52(A)(3) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[16]grave misconduct carries the penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Since the respondent had earlier been declared dropped from the rolls, the penalty of dismissal is now ineffectual. In lieu of dismissal, we hereby impose an administrative fine of P40,000.00, with accompanying forfeiture of all the retirement or separation benefits he may be entitled to, except accrued leave credits. The P40,000.00 fine shall be deducted from any such accrued leave credits, with the respondent personally held liable for any deficiency which shall be directly payable to this Court. He is further declared disqualified from any future government service.
