Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
The Charge of Parricide
Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to death. He believes that no father could kill his own son. According to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of consciousness and froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction where they would take a vehicle in going to a hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on children of tender years must always be with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was only when Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the child’s life. It bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
x x x x
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.[20] Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemar’s cadaver was never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his contention, the latter’s testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with his testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Maria’s testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.
Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this case.
All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.
We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
“Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.”[21]
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after. Noemar’s Death Certificate[22] was also presented in evidence.
There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much for Noemar’s frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While Noemar’s birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be considered.[23] As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while under oath.[24] Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.
There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the barangay captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent “to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture”[25] which is the essence of voluntary surrender.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. “The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim.”[26]
The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide
We find proper the trial court’s award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[27] “In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.”[28]
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetuato death. The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of said mitigating circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
x x x x
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
x x x x
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties ofreclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.[29]
The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries
The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter.[30] Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.[31]
Junior’s testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings were (1) muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of Junior’s face just below the eye and on both legs, which could have been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation which could have been sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks.[32] But if applied with medication, the injuries would heal in a week.[33]
We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was beaten by his father and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves credence especially since the same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother, Maria, and supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.
Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries
We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during the same period.
x x x x
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be in its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.
