Estoppel
The MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City both claim that Justice Gancayco was estopped from challenging the ordinance, because, in 1965, he asked for an exemption from the application of the ordinance. According to them, Justice Gancayco thereby recognized the power of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings.
To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on two grounds: (1) whether the ordinance “takes” private property without due process of law and just compensation; and (2) whether the ordinance violates the equal protection of rights because it allowed exemptions from its application.
On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the ordinance to determine whether or not the ordinance constitutes a “taking” of private property without due process of law and just compensation. It was only in 2003 when he was allegedly deprived of his property when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building. Because he was granted an exemption in 1966, there was no “taking” yet to speak of.
Moreover, in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[21] we held:
It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void orultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in British American Tobacco v. Camacho,[22] we likewise held:
We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act. Indeed, petitioner cannot be faulted for initially undertaking to comply with, and subjecting itself to the operation of Section 145(C), and only later on filing the subject case praying for the declaration of its unconstitutionality when the circumstances change and the law results in what it perceives to be unlawful discrimination. The mere fact that a law has been relied upon in the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for considering petitioner estopped from assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. (Emphasis supplied.)
Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.
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