Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[35] elaborates on the well established doctrine of due process in administrative proceedings as follows:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[36]
Moreover, Department of Health v. Camposano[37] restates the guidelines laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[38] that due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.[39]
In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioner’s decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct.
To recall, after the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the respondents therein, i.e., Reyes and Peñaloza, were ordered to submit their counter-affidavits in order to discuss the charges lodged against them. While Peñaloza acknowledged in his counter-affidavit his participation in the illicit transaction complained of, he pointed to Reyes as the main culprit. Peñaloza thereafter submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza as witnesses who would substantiate his accusations. However, the records reveal that only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished copies of the said affidavits.[40] Thus, Reyes was able to respond only to the affidavit of Acero. It would appear that Reyes had no idea that Peñaloza, a co-respondent in the administrative case, would point an accusing finger at him and even supply the inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. The said affidavits were made known to Reyes only after the rendition of the petitioner’s Decision dated September 24, 2001.
The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the violation of his right to due process in this case. Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his right to due process. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper and Valdehueza, whether before or after the Decision dated September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.
It is true that, in the past, this Court has held that the right to due process of a respondent in an administrative case was not violated if he was able to file a motion for reconsideration to refute the evidence against him. However, the instant case should be differentiated from Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,[41] which likewise involved the issue of administrative due process. In the said case, Ruivivar was found administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her official functions and was meted the penalty of reprimand. In her motion for reconsideration, Ruivivar argued that she was deprived of due process because she was not furnished copies of the affidavits of complainant’s witnesses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman ordered that Ruivivar be furnished with copies of the affidavits of the witnesses, with the directive for her to file any pleading that she may deem appropriate. As Ruivivar still opted not to controvert the affidavits that were belatedly provided to her, the Ombudsman ruled that her right to due process was not violated and her administrative liability was upheld. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Ombudsman, declaring that “the law can no longer help one who had been who had been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance.”[42]
In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded Reyes’ protestations without giving him a similar opportunity, as in Ruivivar, to be belatedly furnished copies of the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper and Valdehueza to enable him to refute the same. As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision dated September 24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes. This the Court cannot sanction. A judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered with due regard to the rights of the parties to due process.
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