The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The COMELEC 2nd Division’s reason for dismissing petitioner’s election protest is the latter’s failure to timely file his Preliminary Conference Brief.
However, a perusal of the records of the instant case would show that petitioner was able to present a copy of the Certification11 issued by the Postmaster of Meycauayan City, Bulacan, attesting to the fact that the Order sent by the COMELEC to petitioner’s counsel informing the latter of the scheduled hearing set on August 12, 2010 and directing him to file his Preliminary Conference Brief was received only on August 16, 2010. Petitioner likewise submitted an advisory issued by the Chief of the Operations Division of the TELECOM Office in Meycauayan that the telegraph service in the said City, through which the COMELEC also supposedly sent petitioner a notice through telegram, has been terminated and the office permanently closed and transferred to Sta. Maria, Bulacan as of April 1, 2009.12 Respondent did not question the authenticity of these documents.
On the basis of the abovementioned documents, the Court finds no justifiable reason why the COMELEC 2ndDivision hastily dismissed petitioner’s election protest. There is no indication that the COMELEC 2nd Division made prior verification from the proper or concerned COMELEC department or official of petitioner’s allegation that he did not receive a copy of the subject Order. In fact, it was only on the day following such dismissal that the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department, through the 2nd Division Clerk, sent a letter to the Postmaster of Meycauayan City, Bulacan requesting for a certification as to the date of receipt of the said Order stating therein that the “certification is urgently needed for the proper and appropriate disposition”13 of petitioner’s election protest. Fairness and prudence dictate that the COMELEC 2nd Division should have first waited for the requested certification before deciding whether or not to dismiss petitioner’s protest on technical grounds.
Petitioner should not be penalized for belatedly filing his Preliminary Conference Brief. While it may be argued that petitioner acquired actual knowledge of the scheduled conference a day prior to the date set through means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC, the fact remains that, unlike his opponent, he was not given sufficient time to thoroughly prepare for the said conference. A one-day delay, as in this case, does not justify the outright dismissal of the protest based on technical grounds where there is no indication of intent to violate the rules on the part of petitioner and the reason for the violation is justifiable. Thus, the COMELEC 2ndDivision committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s protest.
With respect to the COMELEC en banc’s denial of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, it is true that Section 3, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System,14 as well as Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, clearly require that a motion for reconsideration should be verified. However, the settled rule is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction.
In Quintos v. Commission on Elections,15 this Court held that “the alleged lack of verification of private respondent’s Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration is merely a technicality that should not defeat the will of the electorate. The COMELEC may liberally construe or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before the COMELEC.”16
In the same manner, this Court, in the case of Panlilio v. Commission on Elections,17 restated the prevailing principle that the COMELEC’s rules of procedure for the verification of protests and certifications of non-forum shopping should be liberally construed.
In Pacanan v. Commission on Elections,18 this Court, in clarifying the mandated liberal construction of election laws, held thus:
x x x An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep public concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, who is the real candidate elected by the people.
Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec. Thus, we have declared:
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain period one who’s right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.19
This principle was reiterated in the more recent consolidated cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections,20and De Castro v. Commission on Elections,21 where the Court held that in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC “must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes.”
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was not verified, the COMELEC en banc should have considered the merits of the said motion in light of petitioner’s meritorious claim that he was not given timely notice of the date set for the preliminary conference. The essence of due process is to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of one’s claim or defense.22 It is the denial of this opportunity that constitutes violation of due process of law.23 More particularly, procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing.24 As discussed above, the fact that petitioner somehow acquired knowledge or information of the date set for the preliminary conference by means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC is not an excuse to dismiss his protest, because it cannot be denied that he was not afforded reasonable notice and time to adequately prepare for and submit his brief. This is precisely the reason why petitioner was only able to file his Preliminary Conference Brief on the day of the conference itself. Petitioner’s counsel may not likewise be blamed for failing to appear during the scheduled conference because of prior commitments and for, instead, filing an Urgent Motion to Reset Preliminary Conference.
Hence, by denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, without taking into consideration the violation of his right to procedural due process, the COMELEC en banc is also guilty of grave abuse of discretion.
