I wish to share a criminal complaint for Estafa
and BP 22 that I prepared recently, with focus on the legal research aspect
thereof, for the information of my regular readers, to wit:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
OFFICE
OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
X x x CITY
X x x,
Complainant, I.S. No.
_______
-
versus
- For:
ESTAFA and B.P. Blg. 22.
X x x
(Alias:
x x x),
Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT
THE UNDERSIGNED COMPLAINANT respectfully alleges:
1. COMPLAINANT. – The complainant is x x x,
of legal age, married, Filipino and, for purposes of this criminal complaint,
with postal address at:
X
x x
2. RESPPONDENT. – The respondent is x x x,
aka, of legal age, married, xxx national, and with the following three
(3) addresses, where summons and notices may be served, to wit:
X x x.
3. NATURE
OF THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT.
- This is a criminal complaint for ESTAFA and for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involving the sum of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00)
arising from various checks issued by the respondent to the complainant.
4. ULTIMATE
FACTS.
X x x.
4.11.
For
the record, and to form part hereof, by incorporation and reference, attached
hereto are copies of the following supporting documents, to wit:
X x x.
5. DISCUSSION.
APPLICABLE LAWS
5.1.
Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code on deceit/swindling (estfa) provides any
person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned therein shall be
punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years; provided that the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse
of confidence, namely:
X x x.
(b) By misappropriating or
converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
2. By means of any of the
following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
X x x.
(a)
By pretending to have bribed any Government
employee, without prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended
party may deem proper to bring against the
offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of
the penalty.
(b)
By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of check. The
failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the
payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack of insufficiency
of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act. (As amended by Republic Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)
5.2.
Article 316 (other forms of swindling) of the Revised Penal
Code provides that the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more
than three times such value, shall be imposed upon “any person who, to the prejudice
of another, shall execute any fictitious contract.”
5.3.
Article
318 (other deceits) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of
arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and
not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall
defraud or damage another by “any other deceit not mentioned in the
preceding articles of this chapter.”
5.4.
Further, B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
provides:
5.4.1.
Any person who makes or draws and issues any check
to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by fine of not less
than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no
case exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the court.
5.4.2.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person
who having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or
draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of
ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
5.4.3.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company
or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of
such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
5.4.4.
The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full
by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
5.4.5.
It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check,
when refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon presentment, to cause
to be written, printed or stamped in plain language thereon, or attached
thereto, the reason for drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the same: Provided,
That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank,
such fact shall always be
explicitly
stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under this
Act, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having
the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto,
with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of
the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for
payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for
the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.
5.4.6.
Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop
payment, the drawee shall state in the notice that there were no sufficient
funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of such check, if
such be the fact."
5.5.
BP Blg. 22 enumerates the elements of the crime to
be
(1) the
making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
There is
deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the
maker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee
bank of the check issued if the dishonored check is presented within 90 days
from the date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to
make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose.
5.5.1.
The statute has created the prima facie
presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves a state of
mind would be difficult to establish. The presumption does not hold, however,
when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank
of such check within 5 banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee bank.
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not
from the mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there must also
be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the
amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee
of such check.
LATEST APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE: ESTAFA
5.6.
In PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA
BABY P. MONTANER, G.R. No. 184053, August
31, 2011, the accused was convicted for the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged
that on or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Virginia (Baby) P.
Montaner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
Reynaldo Solis in the following manner: said accused by means of false
pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are fully funded draw, make and
issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis ten (10) Prudential Bank Checks, all
having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and all
aforesaid checks were postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for cash knowing
fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the said checks
were presented for payment the same were dishonored by the drawee bank on
reason of “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite demand accused failed and refused to pay
the value thereof to the damage and prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in the
aforementioned total amount of P50,000.00.
To
exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner
denied the allegations that she issued ten (10) checks in private complainant’s
favor claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from her by one Marlyn
Galope because the latter needed money. She gave the ten checks to Galope,
signed the same albeit the space for the date, amount and payee were left blank
so that the checks cannot be used for any negotiation. She further told Galope
that the checks were not funded. When she learned that a case was filed against
her for estafa, she confronted Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that money
will not be given to her if she will not issue the said checks. She has no
knowledge of the notice of dishonor sent to her by private complainant and
claimed that her husband, who supposedly received the notice of dishonor left
for abroad in July 1996 and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.
In
a Decision dated April 8, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant for the
crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentenced her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor as minimum to twenty-two (22) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum and to indemnify complainant Reynaldo
Solis in the amount of P50,000.00.
Appellant
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse ruling was merely
affirmed by the appellate court in its Decision dated February 12, 2008.
Hence,
appellant interposed an appeal before the Supreme Court and put forth a single
assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED–APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER
ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (D) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
Appellant
maintains that she entrusted the subject checks, purportedly signed in blank,
to Marilyn Galope (Galope) out of pity in order for the latter to secure a
loan. Thus, there is purportedly no
certainty beyond reasonable doubt that she issued the checks purposely to
defraud Reynaldo Solis (Solis) into lending her money. She further claims that no transaction had
ever transpired between her and Solis.
Admitting that she may have been imprudent, she nonetheless insists that
her simple imprudence does not translate to criminal liability.
The
Supreme Court was not persuaded.
The Court cited Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315. Swindling
(estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
x x x x
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover
his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the
payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency
of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
According to the Court, the elements of estafa under
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating
or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the
check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3)
damage to the payee.[1]
In the said case, the prosecution sufficiently
established appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According to Solis’s clear and categorical
testimony, appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks,
each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his
house in exchange for their cash equivalent.
From the circumstances, the Court held that it was
evident that Solis would not have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had
it not been for her issuance of the 10 Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were undoubtedly
issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash. However, when Solis attempted to encash them,
they were all dishonored by the bank because the account was already closed.
Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October
13, 1996 which was received by appellant’s husband to inform appellant that her
postdated checks had bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else
face legal action from Solis. Appellant
did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the amount necessary to
cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is an element of the crime of
estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second
sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
As for appellant’s claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank but
signed checks imprudently, without knowing that Galope would give them as a
guarantee for a loan, the Court viewed such statements with the same
incredulity as the lower courts.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself – such as
the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances. The Court has no test
of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.[2]
Appellant wished to impress upon the Court that she
voluntarily parted with her blank but signed checks not knowing or even having
any hint of suspicion that the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely
on them. Verily, appellant’s assertion
defies ordinary common sense and human experience, the Court stated.
Moreover, the Court added, it is elementary that
denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and
self-serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[3] It agreed with the lower courts that
appellant’s bare denial cannot be accorded credence for lack of evidentiary
support. As aptly noted by the trial
court, appellant’s failure to produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her
story is fatal to her cause. In all, the
Court of Appeals committed no error in upholding the conviction of appellant
for estafa. Hence, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the two decisions of both the
trial court and the appellate court.
LATEST APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE: B.P. BLG. 22
5.7.
In
EUMELIA R. MITRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and FELICISIMO S. TARCELO, G.R. NO.
191404, July 5, 2010, the petitioner Eumelia R. Mitra (Mitra) was
the Treasurer, and Florencio L. Cabrera (deceased), Jr. was the President, of
Lucky Nine Credit Corporation (LNCC),
a corporation engaged in money lending activities. Between 1996 and 1999, private respondent
Felicisimo S. Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in LNCC. As the usual practice in money placement
transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the amounts he invested
plus the interest on his investments by Mitra and Cabrera, were issued by LNCC
to Tarcelo.
When Tarcelo
presented these checks for payment, they were dishonored for the reason
“account closed.” Tarcelo made several
oral demands on LNCC for the payment of these checks but he was frustrated.
Constrained, in 2002, he caused the filing of seven informations for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) in the total amount of P925,000.00
with the MTCC in Batangas City.
After trial on
the merits, the MTCC found Mitra and Cabrera guilty of the charges and ordered
them to respectively pay the mandated fines for each violation and with subsidiary imprisonment in all
cases, in case of insolvency and it further adjudged them civilly liable
and ordered them to pay, in solidum,
private complainant Felicisimo S. Tarcelo the amount of NINE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P925,000.000).
Mitra and Cabrera
appealed to the Batangas RTC contending that: they signed the seven checks in
blank with no name of the payee, no amount stated and no date of maturity; they
did not know when and to whom those checks would be issued; the seven checks
were only among those in one or two booklets of checks they were made to sign
at that time; and that they signed the checks so as not to delay the
transactions of LNCC because they did not regularly hold office there. The RTC affirmed the MTCC decision.
Meanwhile, Cabrera died. Mitra alone filed a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals claiming, among others, that there was no
proper service of the notice of dishonor on her. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition
for lack of merit.
Mitra went up to
the Supreme Court on a petition for review and submitted the issues: WHETHER
OR NOT THE ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 MUST BE PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION WHO OWNS THE CURRENT ACCOUNT
WHERE THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE DRAWN BEFORE LIABILITY ATTACHES TO THE
SIGNATORIES; and WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS PROPER SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR
AND DEMAND TO PAY TO THE PETITIONER AND THE LATE FLORENCIO CABRERA, JR.
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
The Court held
that a check is a negotiable instrument that serves as a substitute for money
and as a convenient form of payment in financial transactions and
obligations. The use of checks as
payment allows commercial and banking transactions to proceed without the
actual handling of money, thus, doing away with the need to physically count
bills and coins whenever payment is made.
It permits commercial and banking transactions to be carried out quickly
and efficiently. But the convenience
afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded checks that adversely affect confidence
in our commercial and banking activities, and ultimately injure public
interest.
BP 22 or the
Bouncing Checks Law was enacted for the specific purpose of addressing the
problem of the continued issuance and circulation of unfunded checks by irresponsible
persons. To stem the harm caused by these bouncing checks to the community, BP
22 considers the mere act of issuing an unfunded check as an offense not only
against property but also against public order.[4] The purpose of BP 22 in declaring the mere
issuance of a bouncing check as malum
prohibitum is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate
him, and to maintain social order.[5] The penalty is stiff. BP 22 imposes the
penalty of imprisonment for at least 30 days or a fine of up to double the
amount of the check or both imprisonment and fine.
Specifically, BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks Without Sufficient Funds. — Any person who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not
less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in
no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment
at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be
imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check
if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the
check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
SECTION 2. Evidence of Knowledge of Insufficient Funds.
— The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.
Mitra posited in
the petition that before the signatory to a bouncing corporate check can be
held liable, all the elements of the crime of violation of BP 22 must first be
proven against the corporation. The corporation must first be declared to have
committed the violation before the liability attaches to the signatories of the
checks.
The Court stated
that it found itself unable to agree with Mitra’s posture. The third paragraph
of Section 1 of BP 22 reads: "Where the check is drawn by a corporation,
company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in
behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act." This provision recognizes the reality that a
corporation can only act through its officers. Hence, its wording is
unequivocal and mandatory – that the person
who actually signed the corporate check shall be held liable for a
violation of BP 22. This provision does
not contain any condition, qualification or limitation.
The Court cited
the case of Llamado v. Court of Appeals,[6] where
it ruled that the accused was liable on the unfunded corporate check which he
signed as treasurer of the corporation. He could not invoke his lack of
involvement in the negotiation for the transaction as a defense because BP 22
punishes the mere issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which the
check was issued or in consideration of the terms and conditions relating to
its issuance. In this case, Mitra signed the LNCC checks as treasurer.
Following Llamado, she must then be
held liable for violating BP 22.
Another essential
element of a violation of BP 22 is the drawer’s knowledge that he has
insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank to cover his check. Because
this involves a state of mind that is difficult to establish, BP 22 creates the
prima facie presumption that once the
check is dishonored, the drawer of the check gains knowledge of the
insufficiency, unless within five banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, the drawer pays the holder of the check or makes arrangements with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check. The service of the notice of
dishonor gives the drawer the opportunity to make good the check within those
five days to avert his prosecution for violating BP 22.
Mitra alleged
that there was no proper service on her of the notice of dishonor and, so, an
essential element of the offense is missing. This contention, the Court said, raised a factual issue that was
not proper for review. It is not the function of the Court to re-examine the
finding of facts of the Court of Appeals.
Our review is limited to errors of law and cannot touch errors of facts
unless the petitioner shows that the trial court overlooked facts or
circumstances that warrant a different disposition of the case[7]
or that the findings of fact have no basis on record. Hence, with respect to
the issue of the propriety of service on Mitra of the notice of dishonor, the
Court gives full faith and credit to the consistent findings of the MTCC, the
RTC and the CA.
The defense postulated that
there was no demand served upon the accused, said denial deserves scant consideration.
Positive allegation of the prosecution that a demand letter was served upon the
accused prevails over the denial made by the accused. Though, having denied that there was no
demand letter served on April 10, 2000, however, the prosecution positively
alleged and proved that the questioned demand letter was served upon the
accused on April 10, 2000, that was at the time they were attending Court
hearing before Branch I of this Court.
In fact, the prosecution had submitted a Certification issued by the
other Branch of this Court certifying the fact that the accused were present
during the April 10, 2010 hearing. With
such straightforward and categorical testimony of the witness, the Court
believes that the prosecution has achieved what was dismally lacking in the
three (3) cases of Betty King, Victor Ting and Caras – evidence of the receipt by
the accused of the demand letter sent to her.
The Court accepts the prosecution’s narrative that the accused refused
to sign the same to evidence their receipt thereof. To require the prosecution to produce the
signature of the accused on said demand letter would be imposing an undue
hardship on it. As well, actual receipt
acknowledgment is not and has never been required of the prosecution either by
law or jurisprudence. [emphasis supplied]
With the notice
of dishonor duly served and disregarded, there arose the presumption that Mitra
and Cabrera knew that there were insufficient funds to cover the checks upon
their presentment for payment. In fact,
the account was already closed.
To reiterate the
elements of a violation of BP 22 as contained in the above-quoted provision, the
Court said, a violation exists where:
1. a person makes or draws
and issues a check to apply on account or for value;
2. the person who makes or
draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the full payment of the
check upon its presentment; and
3. the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. [8]
The Court added
that there was no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and that the bank dishonored
the checks because the account had been closed. Notice of dishonor was properly
given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or make arrangements for their
payment within five days from notice. With all the above elements duly proven,
Mitra cannot escape the civil and criminal liabilities that BP 22 imposes for
its breach.[9]
6. PRAYER.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
prayed that after notice and hearing the respondent be indicted for ESTAFA and
VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22 to protect/preserve the right/interest of the
complainant to recover his claim of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), plus exemplary
damages of P100,000.00, moral damages of P100,000.00, attorney’s fees of P125,000.00
plus 5% of the recoverable amounts, and costs of suit.
X x x City, October 18, 2011.
X
x x
Complainant
LTO
Driver’s License No.
__________________
Expiring
on _________
Assisted By:
LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER LAW OFFICES
Counsel for
the Complainant
Unit 15, Star
Arcade. C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife
Village, Las Pinas City 1740
Tel. No.
8725443; Fax No. 8462539.
MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.
Roll No. 33640, 4/27/85
IBP Lifetime Member No. 1907
IBP Leyte Chapter
PTR 1016909, 1/7/11, Las Pinas City
MCLE Compliance No. IV-1326, 2/3/11
SUBSCRIBED
and sworn to before in Muntinlupa City me this ___ day of October 2011,
affiant/complainant showing his official identification document as stated
above.
Administering
Assistant City Prosecutor
Annexes: “A” to “L“, supra.
[3] Gomba v. People, G.R. No. 150536, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 396,
400, citing People v. Magbanua, G.R.
No. 133004, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 617, 630.
[4] Lozano v. Martinez
[5] Rosario
[6]
337 Phil. 153, 160 (1997).
[7] American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, 368 Phil. 555, 569 (1999).
[8] Rigor v. People, 485 Phil. 125, 139 (2004).
[9] In Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807, April 16, 2009 , 585 SCRA 471, 483, we held an
accused corporate officer free from civil liability for the corporate debt
after the lower court acquitted the accused of criminal liability under BP
22. Note that this is a totally
different case from the present case as the issue here is both criminal and
civil liability.
